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1. Introduction  
The article ‘How to cross-examine forensic scientists: A guide for lawyers’ (hereafter 
‘HTCE’) generated interest among forensic scientists in Australia and beyond.1 HTCE 
had several motivations, but the authors’ primary aim was to place the legal reception of 
forensic science and medicine evidence on a firmer epistemological foundation.2 That 
is, to improve legal analysis by directing the attention of lawyers and judges toward the 
most important dimensions of this evidence—e.g. validation, reliability, uncertainty, 
error rates, proficiency, and other human factors—and away from the kinds of 
considerations which often overshadow (or replace) them in quotidian legal 
proceedings.3 The shift in focus—towards demonstrable expertise in the specific 
domain4—is intended to encourage a move from proceedings dominated by battles 
around the credibility of individual witnesses to a more consistent engagement with the 
‘specialised knowledge’ that ought to underpin opinions proffered by forensic 
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Mehera San Roque, Rachel Searston, Jason Tangen, Matthew Thompson & David White, ‘How to cross-examine 
forensic scientists: A guide for lawyers’ (2014) 39 Australian Bar Review 174. 
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Determination’ (2014) 18 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 139, 159-60. 
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practitioners.5 This article, like HTCE, represents an attempt to intervene in a wider 
discussion (and perhaps controversy) around the forensic sciences.6  
 While HTCE may appear provocative, it is intended to encourage lawyers to consider 
asking questions aimed at obtaining insight into the value of forensic science evidence 
through the facts, research and practices supporting it. This approach is legally orthodox 
in the sense that it promotes the use of cross-examination to test the value of 
incriminating opinion evidence during the trial.7 By extension, HTCE is also concerned 
with the presentation and comprehension of forensic science and medicine evidence in 
pre-trial processes—e.g. on the voir dire and in charge and plea negotiations.8 
Simultaneously, HTCE relies on mainstream scientific methods and norms, and so is 
directly relevant to forensic practitioners operating, or purporting to operate, within 
robust scientific frameworks. The questions posed are not merely susceptible to answer 
but generally should be answered with positive evidence—derived through scientific 
research. Forensic practitioners (and others allowed to express expert opinions in 
criminal proceedings) should provide information about the value of techniques, the 
foundations of claimed expertise and provide the means to rationally assess their 
opinions.9 
 This essay is a follow-up to the cross-examination article. It is written as an 
explanatory resource for forensic practitioners confronted with the kinds of questions 
and issues originally posed in HTCE. In this essay we aim to enhance forensic 
practitioners’ understanding of legal, professional and institutional expectations in order 
to provide strategies that might help forensic scientists to respond to issues raised in 
HTCE and help lawyers, judges and jurors to improve decision-making around expert 
opinion evidence. 
 
 
2. Disclosure, transparency, epistemic modesty and impartiality 
The simplest advice we can offer to forensic practitioners is to adopt mainstream 
scientific methods and norms.10 This is likely to: facilitate compliance with the formal 
requirements imposed by courts (e.g. admissibility standards and practice directions) 
and professional codes; improve performance; reduce mistakes and misrepresentations; 
and insulate practitioners and their institutions from criticism and external interference.                                                         
5 Uniform Evidence Law (UEL), s 79(1), see Section 3.A below. We accept that credibility might also be an issue; 
such as where a practitioner has previously misrepresented evidence or there is some reason for doubting their 
opinion or abilities. Generally, credibility is a second order consideration. To evaluate expert opinions evidence, it 
is usually more important to know whether a technique or process works and how well than to focus on the 
credibility or demeanour of an individual. 
6 More generally, see Gary Edmond, ‘What lawyers should know about the forensic “sciences”’ (2015) 37 
Adelaide Law Review 33. 
7 Although we believe that Australian admissibility practices are currently too liberal, improving the performance 
of forensic scientists and lawyers may circumvent the need to actually raise them. 
8 Other interventions have focused primarily on admissibility. See Gary Edmond, ‘Specialised knowledge, the 
exclusionary discretions and reliability: Reassessing incriminating expert opinion evidence‘ (2008) 31 UNSW Law 
Journal 1-55; Edmond, ‘The admissibility of forensic science and medicine evidence under the Uniform Evidence 
Law’; Gary Edmond & Mehera San Roque, ‘Before the High Court - Honeysett v The Queen: Forensic science, 
“specialised knowledge” and the Uniform Evidence Law’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 323; Gary Edmond, ‘A Closer 
Look at Honeysett: Enhancing our Forensic Science and Medicine Jurisprudence’ (2015) 17 Flinders Law Journal 
(forthcoming). 
9 Gary Edmond, ‘Forensic science evidence and the conditions for rational (jury) evaluation’ (2015) 39 Melbourne 
University Law Review (forthcoming). 
10 We are referring to the commitment to testing and standardizing techniques in regular use. More generally, see 
R. Merton, The sociology of science: theoretical and empirical investigations (1973) 266-278 and critical 
commentary: Michael Mulkay, ‘Norms and Ideology in Science’ (1976) 15 Social Science Information 637; 
Michael Mulkay, ‘Interpretation and the use of rules: The case of norms of science’, T. Gieryn (ed.), Science and 
social structure: a festschrift for Robert K. Merton (1980) 111. 
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One way to conceptualise the required (re-)orientation is through the rubric disclosure, 
transparency, epistemic modesty and impartiality. This orientation should inform the 
practice of forensic science and its institutional culture.11  
 Transparency and impartiality should be central components of forensic science 
practice. They are embodied in professional codes as well as the rules that govern 
litigation and its preparation—see Sections 3.B and 3.C. In ways that capture known 
capabilities and evidentiary limitations, forensic practitioners should disclose more 
information to prosecutors (and defence lawyers and judges) in their reports (and 
testimony). Reports and testimony should be transparent. They should enable others, 
both the technically proficient and the technically challenged, to review and understand 
how the evidence was collected, processed and analysed, how particular conclusions 
were reached, and provide insight into uncertainties and limitations with these processes 
and conclusions.12 
 At a minimum, reports should address the requirements of jurisdictional practice 
directions and professional codes of conduct. Forensic practitioners should make their 
routine practices, procedures, standards, and research fully available to the defence. 
When the state relies on forensic science or medicine to prove guilt, there are few 
situations where this information may be legitimately withheld from those being 
prosecuted.13 Further, forensic reports should not omit or elide limitations, uncertainties 
and controversies.14 It is the disclosure of these kinds of information that enables the 
court to determine admissibility and the tribunal of fact to evaluate the probative value 
of forensic science evidence and the impartiality (and credibility) of the practitioner.15 
Failure to provide this information makes it difficult, and in many cases impossible, to 
ascertain whether there is expertise and how probative opinions actually are.16 
Institutions responsible for producing forensic science and medicine evidence should 
standardize reporting practices, decide how to incorporate information about standards 
and protocols, validation studies, error rates, proficiency, and so forth, in the reports 
they produce.  
 In addition to enhanced disclosure and transparency, the opinions of forensic 
practitioners should be epistemologically modest. Practitioners should avoid ‘being too 
proud or confident about abilities’.17 Epistemic modesty is inconsistent with hubris, 
ignorance and arrogance. Practitioners should avoid over-claiming and exaggerating 
performance, by acting in ways consistent with demonstrated ability. Opinions should 
be grounded in what is known about the capabilities and limits of techniques and the 
proficiency of individuals.18 Where there is limited knowledge, practitioners should                                                         
11 See J. Mnookin, S. Cole, I. Dror, B. Fisher, M. Houck, K. Inman et al, ‘The need for a research culture in the 
forensic sciences’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law Review 725-79. 
12 NAS report. 
13 Understanding the process and its limitations is generally more important than preventing ‘criminals’ from 
finding out about it. Failure to disclose techniques and especially limitations, threatens the primary goals of the 
accusatorial trial—to provide a substantially fair and open process that produces an accurate verdict. There may be 
some circumstances where technical capabilities need to be kept secret but these will be truly exceptional. 
14 See Stephen T. Goudge, Final Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology Services in Ontario 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2008) at 417-9 [Goudge report]. 
15 We note that impartiality has limits (especially as an analytical category to evaluate evidence), but as a 
normative commitment it is desirable, especially among state-employed forensic scientists. See the discussion by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in White Burgess Langille v Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23. 
16 Limitations and oversights are not necessarily identified or repaired by trial safeguards. See Gary Edmond and 
Mehera San Roque, ‘The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the Frailty of the Criminal Trial‘ (2012) 24 Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice 51-68. 
17 Merriam Webster online (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modest) accessed 24 June 2015. 
18 In Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122, [23], the High Court of Australia endorsed definitions of 
‘knowledge’ from Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 509 US 579, 590 (1993) and R v Tang (2006) 65 
NSWLR 681, 713–14. Specifically, the Court endorsed the Macquarie Dictionary definition of ‘knowledge’, 
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concede uncertainties and limitations, and the strength of conclusions should be 
moderated accordingly. Opinions should be steeped in ‘knowledge’ rather than 
speculation, assumptions, subjective beliefs, traditions and past practices.19 This means 
that: techniques should be formally tested and practitioners appropriately trained; 
reporting practices should accurately reflect the level of practitioner competence and the 
capabilities of techniques; and practitioners should be conversant with scientific 
research relevant to performance and the expression of results. In the absence of 
scientific research, there will normally be a widespread need for caution—a need to 
moderate ‘confidence’ and the strength of opinion.  
 There is, as the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recognised in Forensic 
Science in the United States (2009), a need for greater ‘epistemological humility’ 
among forensic practitioners.20 Research on the performance of latent fingerprint 
examiners affords a useful example. Recent validation studies confirm that fingerprint 
examiners possess genuine expertise.21 These examiners possess pronounced abilities 
relative to laypersons in discriminating between fingerprints from the same people and 
those from different people, even under time constrained and noisy conditions.22 
However, studies also revealed that even highly trained and experienced fingerprint 
examiners occasionally make errors,23 disagree about the sufficiency of the information 
and number of features in the fingerprints when making decisions,24 and in some, 
perhaps atypical, contexts interpretation appears susceptible to contextual bias.25 
Research also questions widely held beliefs about the correlation between ability and 
                                                                                                                                                              
namely ‘acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from study or investigation’ (emphasis in original). More 
generally, see Scott Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’ 107(1998) 107 Yale Law 
Journal 1535, 1590, who suggests that the ‘mark of the epistemic is the concern with warranted belief’; and E. 
Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An Interdisciplinary Framework for Intellectual Due Process 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
19 Here the point is not to call something scientific or non-scientific, or technical or experience-based or merely an 
opinion. Rather, the point is what does available research support in terms of capabilities. 
20 National Academy of Sciences, Strengthening the Forensic Sciences in the United States: A Path Forward (The 
National Academies Press, 2009) (‘NAS report’), 142 quoting Jennifer Mnookin, ‘The validity of latent fingerprint 
identification: Confessions of a fingerprinting moderate’ (2008) 7 Law, Probability & Risk 127. See also Deborah 
Turkheim, Flawed Convictions: ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome’ and the Inertia of Injustice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
21 Thompson, M. B., Tangen, J. M., & McCarthy, D. J. (2014). Human matching performance of genuine crime 
scene latent fingerprints. Law and Human Behavior, 38(1), 84-93. 
22 Ulery, B. T., Hicklin, R. A., Buscaglia, J., & Roberts, M. A. (2011). Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent 
fingerprint decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(19), 
7733–7738. doi:10.1073/pnas.1018707108; Tangen, J. M., Thompson, M. B., & McCarthy, D. J. (2011). 
Identifying fingerprint expertise. Psychological Science, 22(8), 995-997; Thompson, M. B., & Tangen, J. M. 
(2014). The nature of expertise in fingerprint matching: Experts can do a lot with a little. PloS one, 9(12), 
e114759. 
23 Ulery, B. T., Hicklin, R. A., Buscaglia, J., & Roberts, M. A. (2012). Repeatability and reproducibility of 
decisions by latent fingerprint examiners. PloS one, 7(3), e32800; Langenburg, G., Champod, C., & Genessay, T. 
(2012). Informing the judgments of fingerprint analysts using quality metric and statistical assessment tools. 
Forensic science international, 219(1), 183-198. But see Thompson, M. B., Tangen, J. M., & McCarthy, D. J. 
(2013). Expertise in fingerprint identification. Journal of forensic sciences, 58(6), 1519-1530 for a discussion 
about generalizing the results from laboratory-based experiments to the everyday operations of a fingerprint 
bureau. 
24 Ulery, B. T., Hicklin, R. A., Buscaglia, J., & Roberts, M. A. (2011). Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent 
fingerprint decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(19), 
7733–7738. doi:10.1073/pnas.1018707108; Ulery, B. T., Hicklin, R. A., Roberts, M. A., & Buscaglia, J. (2014). 
Measuring What Latent Fingerprint Examiners Consider Sufficient Information for Individualization 
Determinations. PloS one, 9(11), e110179; Ulery, B. T., Hicklin, R. A., Roberts, M. A., & Buscaglia, J. (2015). 
Changes in latent fingerprint examiners’ markup between Analysis and Comparison. Forensic science 
international, 247, 54-61. 
25 Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E., & Kukucka, J. (2013). The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and 
proposed solutions. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2(1), 42-52. 
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experience as a latent fingerprint examiner.26 These studies, in conjunction with 
philosophical and empirical objections to the logic underpinning the identification 
paradigm,27 would seem to require fingerprint examiners to: provide more information 
about their practices; identify limitations and the risk of error in their reports and 
testimony; and, modify the meaning they attribute to ‘a match’—see Section 4.B.28 
 Epistemologically-warranted opinions are required to facilitate the administration of 
justice through rational decision-making.29 Such opinions improve charge and plea 
negotiation, admissibility decisions and (presumably) verdicts. They serve to prevent 
unnecessary exclusion of evidence and the misattribution of weight. Epistemic modesty 
is consistent with legal rules and professional obligations. As we shall see, forensic 
practitioners swear an oath (or make an affirmation) to tell the ‘whole truth’, have 
obligations to serve the court, and according to procedural rules should refer to 
‘specialised knowledge’ and disclose limitations and controversies in reports and 
testimony.  
 Disclosure, transparency and epistemic modesty are all consistent with the 
expectation that forensic practitioners will act impartially. The goal of the forensic 
scientist is not to win the case, or to assist the prosecution, or to thwart the defence, 
although that’s how it may often feel to those in the ‘trenches’ of investigations and 
prosecutions. Forensic practitioners should not ‘be enticed into a search for evidence to 
bolster the suspicions of an investigator’, nor ‘join in the celebrations of a conviction.’30 
In criminal proceedings, the role of the forensic practitioner is to assist the court to 
administer justice through the provision of impartial expert opinion and explanation.31 
This requires the provision of independent opinions derived using reliable techniques, 
that are susceptible to being understood and evaluated by the decision maker—see 
Sections 3.B and 3.C.32 
 This article aims to encourage forensic practitioners to think more about 
independence and impartiality, to disclose more, to be more transparent about their 
practices and reporting, and to make sure that opinions are expressed with appropriate                                                         
26 Thompson, M. B., Tangen, J. M., & McCarthy, D. J. (2014). Human matching performance of genuine crime 
scene latent fingerprints. Law and human behavior, 38(1), 84. Generally, benchmarking tests of fingerprint 
examination, as in other forensic science domains, provide evidence that can be used to estimate the bounds of a 
particular technique. See also research on unfamiliar face matching by D. White et al, ‘Perceptual expertise in 
forensic facial image comparison’ (2015) (under review). 
27 On the identification paradigm, see Michael Saks and Jonathan J Koehler, ‘The Individualization Fallacy in 
Forensic Science’ (2008) 61 Vanderbilt Law Review 199; Simon A Cole, ‘Forensics without Uniqueness, 
Conclusions without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification’ (2009) 8 Law, 
Probability, & Risk 233; Jonathan J Koehler and Michael J Saks, ‘Individualization claims in forensic science: 
Still unwarranted’ (2010) 75 Brooklyn Law Review 1187. 
28 It is important to emphasise that more scientific attention has been directed toward fingerprint evidence than 
most comparison techniques (e.g., shoe, foot and tyre prints, tool marks, handwriting, image, voice and gait 
comparison). It is far from clear that other techniques are as robust. 
29 There may be a limited place for more speculative approaches in investigations, but these should not form part 
of charging decisions, plea negotiations and prosecutions. There is a need for caution because the use of unreliable 
and speculative techniques in investigations may waste resources and mislead investigators; especially is 
undisclosed. 
30 Association of Forensic Science Providers. (2009). Standards for the formulation of evaluative forensic science 
expert opinion. Sci & Justice. 49:161-164; Evett, I. (2009). Evaluation and professionalism. Sci & Justice. 49: 159-
160.  
31 Impartiality requires that forensic practitioners discharge their responsibilities to assist the court to reach an 
accurate conclusion, including by explaining uncertainties and limitations—rather than conceiving of their role as 
one of assisting police or the prosecution to secure a conviction. See Emma Cunliffe, ‘Independence, Reliability & 
Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials’ (2013) 45 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 284 at 285-6; Stephen T. 
Goudge, Final Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology Services in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer, 2008) at 503-505. 
32 In other contexts, forensic practitioners should perform their work, especially analyses, accurately and 
impartially. 
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qualifications.33 Together, disclosure, transparency, epistemic modesty and impartiality 
embody good faith means of fulfilling the important social responsibilities invested in 
the state’s forensic practitioners.  
 
  
3. Admissibility standards, procedural rules and the professional responsibilities of 
expert witnesses and prosecutors 
In this section we review a range of admissibility standards, procedural rules and formal 
responsibilities, directing attention to validity and reliability, independence and 
partisanship, error rates, limitations, controversies, uncertainties and so forth. Our goal 
in distilling these issues, from both Australian and foreign jurisdictions, is to remove 
some of the accretions and more ad hominem dimensions from conventional legal 
approaches to expert opinion. 
 
A. Admissibility standards 
Several common law jurisdictions boast an explicit ‘reliability’ standard (e.g. US 
Federal Courts and many US state courts) or, like Canada, require lawyers to direct their 
attention to the reliability of expert opinion evidence.34 In 2011 the Law Commission of 
England and Wales recommended a new admissibility rule requiring trial judges to 
consider whether forensic science evidence is ‘sufficiently reliable’ for criminal 
proceedings. The Commission’s recommendation (and draft bill) was not adopted by the 
British government, though in its wake judges have taken it upon themselves to import 
the need for reliability into English procedural rules.35 A recent review of criminal 
justice reiterated the importance of reliable forensic science evidence in English 
courts.36 
 The need to attend to reliability (really validity and reliability) has expanded and 
become widely accepted in common law jurisdictions, particularly Anglo-American 
practice.37 While it has not (yet) led to the exclusion of much forensic science and 
medicine evidence, it has encouraged lawyers and judges to be more attentive to validity 
and reliability issues. Even jurisdictions that are yet to impose a formal reliability 
standard (such as Australia, New Zealand and some US states) have not been entirely 
inattentive to issues of validity and reliability.38  
 In Australia, the admissibility of expert opinion evidence is regulated by uniform 
evidence legislation (the ‘UEL’ operates in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT, and 
federal courts) or common law, augmented by statute (in South Australia, Western 
Australia and Queensland).39 The admissibility of opinion evidence is dependent upon                                                         
33 In some cases it may be appropriate to restrict use or reliance until experimental studies confirm reliability of the 
technique(s). 
34 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 US 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 
(1999) and the revised U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence (1975) r 702. See also R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239; R v 
Abbey [2009] ONCA 624. 
35 Law Commission of England and Wales, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, 34 
Law Com. Report No. 325 (London: HMSO, 2011); Criminal Procedure Rules (2014) r 33 (England and Wales). 
See also Tony Ward, ‘Expert Evidence and the Law Commission: Implementation Without Legislation?’ [2013] 
Criminal Law Review 561. 
36 The Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson, Review of the Effectiveness of Criminal Justice (London, 2015) 60-62. 
37 See Gary Edmond, Simon Cole, Emma Cunliffe & Andrew Roberts, ‘Admissibility Compared’ (2013) 
University of Denver Criminal Law Review 31-109. 
38 See R v Lundy [2014] NZHC 2527; New Zealand Pork Industry Board v Director-General of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry [2013] NZCA 65; R v Carter [2005] NZCA 422. The New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 s 
26 includes references to both ‘knowledge’ and ‘expert’. 
39 South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland are governed by a mixture of parochial evidence acts and 
the common law. 
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the party proffering the evidence—usually the prosecutor in criminal proceedings—
satisfying an exception to the exclusionary approach to opinion evidence. In most 
Australian jurisdictions the primary exception for expert opinion states: 
 
79 Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge  
(1) If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the 
opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially 
based on that knowledge.40 
 
Australian courts have explained that s 79(1) has two basic requirements: ‘[t]he first is 
that the witness who gives the evidence “has specialised knowledge based on the 
person’s training, study or experience”; the second is that the opinion expressed in 
evidence by the witness “is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge”.’41 This 
approach requires forensic practitioners to present the opinion in a form that enables 
these questions to be answered and, in particular, requires the identification of relevant 
knowledge.42  
 Australian courts have resisted the temptation to specify formal admissibility 
criteria—such as those advanced by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.43 Although, in its most recent decision on s 79(1) of the UEL the 
High Court of Australia focused attention to the meaning of ‘specialised knowledge’. In 
Honeysett v The Queen, a decision considering the admissibility of an anatomist’s 
opinion about similarities between the body shape of the accused and a person of 
interest covered from head to toe captured by CCTV cameras during a robbery, the 
High Court concluded that the opinion evidence had been wrongly admitted.44 In a 
narrow decision, avoiding the need to determine whether lawyers and judges should 
attend to validity and reliability, the Court accepted that while the specific witness 
possessed specialised anatomical knowledge (and some photographic experience), he 
was not an expert in image interpretation and comparison and so could not proffer an 
opinion relevant to identity.45 
 Without submissions on the policy implications the High Court was reluctant to 
impose a formal reliability standard on expert opinion evidence. The Court in Honeysett 
did, however, direct attention to the ‘specialised knowledge’ on which admissible 
opinions should be based.46 In so doing the Court produced its most detailed exegesis on 
the phrase. 
 
“Specialised knowledge” is to be distinguished from matters of “common knowledge”. Specialised 
knowledge is knowledge which is outside that of persons who have not by training, study or 
experience acquired an understanding of the subject matter.  … [T]he person’s training, study or 
experience must result in the acquisition of knowledge.  The Macquarie Dictionary defines 
“knowledge” as “acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from study or in investigation” 
(emphasis added) and it is in this sense that it is used in s 79(1). The concept is captured in 
Blackmun J’s formulation in Daubert:  “the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective                                                         
40 UEL s 79(1).  
41 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21, [32]; Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCA 29, [23].  
42 HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414, [39]. The knowledge should be independent of the practitioner and any 
ability. There should be some experimental study that can be referred to (and produced if necessary). 
43 In Daubert the Court offered a list of criteria that might be used flexibly to assist trial judges with reliability 
(and validity). The Daubert criteria include: testing; peer review and publication; error rates; whether standards 
exist and had been applied; and, whether the technique was generally accepted. 44 Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCA 29. 
45 Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCA 29. [42]. 46 Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCA 29. [43]. According to the Court, ‘Professor Henneberg’s opinion was not 
based on his undoubted knowledge of anatomy.’ Rather, the ‘conclusion was based on Professor Henneberg’s 
subjective impression of what he saw when he looked at the images.’ 
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belief or unsupported speculation.  …  [It] applies to any body of known facts or to any body of 
ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds”47 
 
In UEL jurisdictions (and perhaps more broadly), those who are presented as, or claim 
to be, experts must have knowledge and abilities beyond the ‘common knowledge’ of 
ordinary persons. Moreover, their opinions must be more than ‘subjective belief’ and 
‘unsupported speculation’.48 Mere training, study or experience, and even legal and 
investigative traditions, cannot sustain the admission of opinions under this reading of 
the Uniform Evidence Law. For, to be admissible, any opinion must be based on 
‘knowledge’ not just a practitioner’s ‘training, study or experience’. Moreover, those 
proffering scientific and technical evidence should be conversant with relevant 
‘specialised knowledge’, and the formal ‘study or … investigation’ underpinning it.49  
 While the High Court is yet to consider whether s 79 embodies a reliability test, other 
courts have begun to insist on validity and reliability.50 Recently, the Victorian Court of 
Appeal effectively circumvented s 79 by requiring trial judges, when asked to balance 
the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused 
as part of admissibility decision making (under UEL s 137), to consider the ‘reliability’ 
of the evidence at that stage.51 In imposing the first substantial reliability test in 
Australia, the Court in Tuite v The Queen explained: 
 
The obvious risk in a criminal trial when expert evidence is led from a forensic scientist is that a 
jury will give the evidence more weight than it deserves. To prevent unfair prejudice of that kind, 
it is essential that the reliability of expert evidence be established to the court’s satisfaction (under 
s 137) before it is led. We have concluded that the touchstone of reliability for this purpose is 
proof of appropriate validation, both of the underlying science (where necessary) and of the 
particular methodology being employed.52 
 
This approach requires the trial judge to attend to reliability and validity. In Victoria, at 
least, section 137 requires the trial judge to exclude forensic science evidence where the 
probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.53 Where the probative 
value is uncertain there will normally be a real risk of misunderstanding, over-valuation 
or mis-use that, in most cases, can only be averted through the insights provided by 
validation studies. Cross-examination and judicial instructions—however skilled or 
careful—do not necessarily overcome the failure to validate and the risk that the 
tribunal of fact may mis-use forensic science evidence of unknown probative value.54                                                         
47 Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCA 29, [23]. 
48 Ibid, quoting from Daubert 
49 The High Court allowed that ‘specialised knowledge’ could be obtained ‘without any formal qualifications … 
by experience’ but only with regard to ‘matters that are not of a scientific or technical kind’: Ibid. 
50 In Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148, [70], the Victorian Court of Appeal concluded that earlier decisions 
such as R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 and Honeysett meant that it was not possible to read ‘reliability’ into 
‘specialised knowledge’ from s 79. This approach is inconsistent with the interpretations of ‘knowledge’ and 
procedural requirements imposed by superior courts in other jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada, 
England and Wales. Notwithstanding Tang, Honeysett and Tuite, the High Court has yet to decide the issue. See 
Edmond, ‘The admissibility of forensic science and medicine evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law’. 
51 Section 137 of the UEL states: ‘In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by 
the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.’ This is 
similar, though not identical, to the common law Christie discretion.  
52 Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148, [11], [102], [103]ff. Dangers of mis-use and deference were also raised in 
HG, [44] and Honeysett, [45]. 
53 Tuite perpetuates the schism between the courts in NSW and Victoria. See Gary Edmond, David Hamer, 
Andrew Ligertwood & Mehera San Roque, ‘Christie, section 137 and forensic science evidence after Dupas v The 
Queen and R v XY’ (2014) 40 Monash Law Review 389-412. Interestingly, the Family Court of Australia seems to 
prefer the Victorian approach, see McGregor & McGregor [2012] FamCAFC 69. 
54 The NAS Report, 53, concluded that trial safeguards have been ‘utterly ineffective’ in ensuring the reliability of 
forensic science. HTCE and this paper are predicated on the proposition that skilled cross-examination and judicial 
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 A final, though fundamental, issue for admissibility reinforces recent Victorian 
interest in validity and reliability. Several Australian courts have emphasised the need to 
place the tribunal of fact (or decision-maker) in a position where they are capable of 
rationally evaluating the opinion evidence.55 While the tribunal of fact ought to consider 
forensic science evidence in the context of the overall case, for each piece of evidence 
they should be placed in a position to make a credible assessment of its probative 
value.56 This idea, captured (or endorsed) in several Anglo-Australian decisions, was 
clearly expressed in the influential case of Davie v The Magistrates of Edinburgh.57  
 
[It is a fundamental duty of the expert witness] to furnish the judge or jury with the necessary 
scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to 
form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in 
evidence. … [T]he bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however eminent, upon the issue in controversy, 
will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-examination nor independently 
appraised ...58 
 
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the US Supreme Court similarly questioned the 
admissibility of ‘opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert’.59 
 As these extracts make clear, courts should not be confronted with bare assertions. 
Judges and jurors should not be expected to speculate about validity and reliability or 
distill probative value from the subjective beliefs of practitioners based on impressions 
of the apparent value of experience and independence, or their demeanour, confidence 
and resilience during cross-examination.60 Rather, there should be information 
supporting reliability and facilitating evaluation.  
 
B. Legal Practice Directions 
The increased interest in reliability and enhanced disclosure in expert reports and oral 
testimony is not limited to admissibility requirements. A useful example of the sort of 
contemporary legal expectations on forensic practitioners can be observed in the 
practice direction recently issued by the courts in Victoria: Expert Evidence in Criminal 
Trials.61  
 
Practice Note: Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials 
 
Purpose                                                                                                                                                                
instructions have the potential to play a role in a more rational approach to forensic science. See also Joseph 
Sanders, ‘Utterly Ineffective? Do courts have a role to play in improving the quality of forensic expert testimony?’ 
(2010) 38 Fordham Urban Law Journal 547. 
55 See e.g. Makita Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305, [85]; Hillstead v R [2005] WASCA 116; Dasreef Pty 
Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588. 
56 Ron Allen and Jon Miller, ‘The Common Law Theory of Experts:  Deference or Education’ (1993) 87 
Northwestern University Law Review 1131; Brewer, ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’. 
57 Davie v Lord Provost, Magistrates and Counsellors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34. See the Goudge 
Report, at 414-20. 
58 Davie, 40. See also Tony Ward, ‘“A new and more rigorous approach” to expert evidence in England and 
Wales?’ (2015) 19 International Journal of Evidence & Proof (forthcoming). 
59 522 US 136, 146 (1997). 
60 These might be influenced by case exigencies, client instructions, the strategy adopted, technical abilities, 
resources and the competence of the cross-examiner and tend to vary dramatically between cases. On principle, we 
should be looking for solutions (or standards) that are less case-dependant and less susceptible to inconsistency. 
61 Other examples include the Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM 7: Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal 
Court of Australia and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Schedule 7: Expert Witness Code of Conduct—
which applies in criminal proceedings by virtue of Part 75 Rule 3(j) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW). See also The 
Criminal Procedure Rules (2014) Part 33 (England and Wales). 
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To enhance the quality and reliability of expert evidence relied on by the prosecution and the 
accused in criminal trials  
… 
Expert’s duty to the Court  
2.1 An expert has an overriding duty to assist the Court impartially, by giving objective, unbiased 
opinion on matters within the expert’s specialised knowledge.  
2.2 This duty overrides any obligation to the commissioning party or to the person by whom the 
expert is paid.  
…  
Content of all expert reports  
4.1 All expert reports to which this Practice Note applies … shall state the opinion or opinions of 
the expert and shall state, specify or provide—  
… 
(c)  whether and to what extent the opinion(s) in the report are based on the expert’s specialised 
knowledge, and the training, study experience on which that specialised knowledge is 
based;  
(d)  the material, observed facts, reported facts, assumed facts and other assumptions on which 
each opinion expressed in the report is based … 
(f)  (if applicable) that a particular question, issue or matter falls outside the expert’s 
specialised knowledge;  
(g)  any examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert has relied, identifying 
the responsible laboratory by which, and the relevant accreditation standard under which, 
the examination, test or other investigation was performed; … 
(i)  any qualification of an opinion expressed in the report, without which the report would or 
might be incomplete or misleading;  
(j)  any limitation or uncertainty affecting the reliability of  
(i)  the methods or techniques used; or  
(ii)  the data relied on,  
to arrive at the opinion(s) in the report; and  
(k)  any limitation or uncertainty affecting the reliability of the opinion(s) in the report as a 
result of—  
(i)  insufficient research; or   
(ii)  insufficient data.  
 
4.2 Where an expert is aware of any significant and recognised disagreement or controversy within 
the relevant field of specialised knowledge, which is directly relevant to the expert’s ability, 
technique or opinion, the expert must disclose the existence of that disagreement or controversy.62   
 
 These new procedural rules assist the court to identify relevant ‘specialised 
knowledge’ (see Practice Direction: 2.1, 4.1(c) and (f), above) and determine whether 
an opinion is based upon it, as required by the admissibility test in UEL s 79 (or the 
need to consider probative value in s 137 following Tuite). They require forensic 
practitioners to pro-actively disclose assumptions and underlying facts, limitations with 
their methods or underlying research, uncertainties in their conclusions, controversy in 
the domain, along with their qualifications and experience. Forensic practitioners have 
the responsibility to make sure that their testimony embodies what is ‘known’ and what 
can be legitimately claimed and to make that clear. Experts should not omit information 
or provide partial evidence on the basis that any elisions or limitations will be identified 
and corrected through the course of adversarial proceedings. 
 While the terminology in practice directions tends to be legal rather than scientific, 
much of the information that is required to be disclosed under existing rules is 
consistent with the kinds of issues that HTCE suggested might be profitably explored. 
                                                        
62 Practice Notes: Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials (Victoria, 2014). Accessed 
(https://www.countycourt.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/forms/Practice%20Note%20-
%20Expert%20Evidence%20in%20Criminal%20Trials_FINAL%20%28June%202014%29_0.pdf) 24 June 2015. 
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We endeavored to draw attention to the sorts of factors that those purporting to be 
experts should routinely include in compliant reports (and testimony)—see Section 4.F. 
 
C. The professional responsibilities of expert witnesses  
 
i. Professional Codes 
The obligations of expert witnesses find even stronger expression in professional 
codes, especially the need for impartiality in the production and provision of 
evidence. From a range of reasonably generic professional codes we have selected the 
Code of Professional Practice for Members of the Australian and New Zealand 
Forensic Science Society (ANZFSS). Its preamble affirms the need for ‘forensic 
practitioners’ to ‘utilise knowledge and experience … without discrimination or 
prejudice, treating all with respect, honesty, equality and integrity’.63 Members must 
‘act truthfully and objectively, and not knowingly provide misleading information, 
statements, reports, opinions or evidence, nor knowingly misrepresent a situation’. Of 
special interest, practitioners must: 
 
•  conduct and document all examinations and analysis using established protocols and fit-for-
purpose or validated methods  
•  render opinions having a basis that is demonstratively valid  
•  not withhold any findings, where inculpatory or exculpatory, that would cause the facts of a 
case to be misrepresented or distorted, and,  
•  disclose or make available test methods if requested.  
 
The Code also requires that forensic practitioners ‘must, both orally and in writing, 
express opinions, make statements, or give evidence with fairness, honesty, and only 
on the basis of adequate knowledge.’64 
 The Code raises disclosure in the context of conflicts of interest. Obligations 
include: 
 
• fully informing the client as to any limitations or legitimate concerns that a forensic 
practitioner might have with regard to their competence relevant to the client’s specific 
instructions, and/or,  
•  if competence is not fully established organising for a person competent in the area to 
provide supervision of or advice to the forensic practitioner in relation to the task.65 
 
The Code also raises the issue of limitations, though primarily in the area of 
competence. Nevertheless, the general thrust of this Code is consistent with the issues 
raised in HTCE as well as the legal rules and practice directions discussed above. 
Indeed, the Code raises the need for ‘demonstrably valid’ methods. Again we see that 
it is imperative for forensic practitioners to act with impartiality and integrity. For the 
reasons we have explained, which are consistent with the terms and thrust of the 
Code, this requires more disclosure, greater transparency about what is done                                                         
63 See Code of Professional Practice, The Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society. Accessed 
(http://anzfss.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ANZFSS-Code-of-Professional-Practice-Final.pdf) 19 June 2015. 
64 Code of Professional Practice, The Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society. Accessed. 
65 Here, ‘client’ should be interpreted broadly, in terms of the various constituencies served by forensic 
scientists—which include the community and defendants. Regardless of the business models that forensic or police 
organisations might use, the police and prosecutors are not the forensic practitioner’s clients. It is preferable to 
conceptualise the court as the ‘client’; even if only a small proportion of results ever make it into criminal 
proceedings and the court does not pay for the service. There are a range of undesirable orientations and potential 
influences introduced by conceptualising investigators and prosecutors as clients, especially if using a service 
model. 
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‘backstage’, and clear articulation of the basis and limitations, including whether 
abilities (and current expressions) are supported through independent validation and 
rigorous proficiency testing. 
 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ANZFSS  
 
Preamble:  
The forensic sciences and related disciplines utilise knowledge and experience to enhance the 
welfare and safety of all members of the community without discrimination or prejudice, 
treating all with respect, honesty, equality and integrity. Forensic practitioners display 
technical, scientific and professional understanding in the application of their profession and 
continually develop their knowledge and skills throughout their working careers. A 
professional code of practice is required to formalise how forensic practitioners meet these 
obligations. A professional must also meet any legal or workplace standards and codes of 
conduct.  
 
Principles:  
The key principles which assist Forensic Practitioners meet their professional roles and 
responsibilities are embodied in four obligations, these being:  
•  to society  
•  to the Justice system  
•  to clients and/or employers, and,  
•  general professional obligations.  
 
1. Obligations to Society … 
1.2 Act with honesty, integrity, fairness and without discrimination.  
Forensic practitioners must act with honesty, integrity, fairness and without unlawful 
discrimination.  
 
2. Obligations to Clients and Employers  
2.1 Act truthfully, objectively, and not mislead people, nor engage in misrepresentation, 
including through omission.  
Forensic practitioners must act truthfully and objectively, and not knowingly provide 
misleading information, statements, reports, opinions or evidence, nor knowingly 
misrepresent a situation.  
Forensic practitioners must never misrepresent credentials, education, training, experience or 
membership status.  
2.2 Disclosure obligations  
Forensic practitioners must disclose actual or possible conflicts of interest to a client or 
employer upon discovery of that actual, potential or perceived, conflict of interest. Conflicts of 
interest will include any financial or other interest that is likely to affect, or appear to affect, 
the forensic practitioner’s judgement. … 
Disclosure includes:  
•  forensic practitioners have an overriding duty to the court and justice system for 
disclosure. Client confidentiality is important but should not to be an excuse for non-
disclosure. Where a forensic practitioner believes they are being inhibited from 
appropriate disclosure they should: − seek explicit authorisation by the client to disclose 
specified information 
2.3 Examinations and analyses  
A forensic practitioner must:  
•  examine and analyse the evidence in a case provided to them in a manner proportionate 
to the nature of the case  
•  conduct and document all examinations and analysis using established protocols and fit-
for-purpose or validated methods  
•  render opinions having a basis that is demonstratively valid  
•  not withhold any findings, where inculpatory or exculpatory, that would cause the facts 
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of a case to be misrepresented or distorted, and,  
•  disclose or make available test methods if requested.  
 
3. General Professional Obligations  
3.1 Apply knowledge, skill and judgement  
Forensic practitioners must bring knowledge, skill, judgement and care that are of a standard 
which might reasonably be expected by the public by relevant professional peers, or as 
determined by formal standards.  
3.2 Not engage in professional misconduct, fraudulent, or dishonest behaviour  
Forensic practitioners must not:  
•  engage in misconduct in a professional respect, or,  
•  engage in fraudulent or dishonest behaviour in their forensic practice.  
3.3 Communicate with fairness, honesty, and adequate knowledge  
Forensic practitioners must, both orally and in writing, express opinions, make statements, or 
give evidence with fairness, honesty, and only on the basis of adequate knowledge. … 
3.5 Work within areas of competence and not misrepresent competence  
Forensic practitioners must:  
•  undertake forensic services only within their area of competence  
•  not misrepresent their competence, and,  
•  not knowingly permit forensic practitioners whose work they are responsible for to 
breach the above obligations. … 
Examples of not misrepresenting competence in an area of practice include:  
•  fully informing the client as to any limitations or legitimate concerns that a forensic 
practitioner might have with regard to their competence relevant to the client’s specific 
instructions, and/or,  
•  if competence is not fully established organising for a person competent in the area to 
provide supervision of or advice to the forensic practitioner in relation to the task. … 
3.7 Continue to develop knowledge, skills and expertise  
Forensic practitioners must:  
•  continue to develop relevant knowledge, skills, and expertise throughout their careers  
•  actively assist and encourage those with whom they are associated to do likewise, and,  
•  seek to meet Continuing Professional Development (CPD) requirements appropriate to their 
discipline and role.66 
 
 Consideration of the Code confirms that the approach recommended in HTCE is 
orthodox. In contrast, current practices in some forensic science disciplines tend to be 
inconsistent, or not fully compliant, with formal legal rules and professional duties. 
There is an onus on forensic practitioners to comply with the obligations owed to the 
criminal justice system, the community, employers and the profession.67 Legal 
practitioners hold a corresponding responsibility to understand the professional 
obligations of forensic practitioners and ensure that they are discharged. 
 
ii. Employment contracts and obligations to employers 
Many forensic science and policing organisations have their own professional standards 
or codes of conduct (supplementing the other codes), which espouse integrity, 
impartiality and transparency. These policies require forensic practitioners (whether 
police or civilians) to conduct themselves in ways that promote institutional values and 
uphold the law. Employers and employment contracts insist that employees act with 
honesty and integrity, maintain impartiality and professionalism, and take personal                                                         
66 Available at < http://anzfss.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ANZFSS-Code-of-Professional-Practice-Final.pdf> 
(accessed on 16 March 2015). 
67 We have not included complainant/victims here, because these are not special ‘clients’ but are part of the 
community. Interactions and dispositions may create particular difficulties for some types of practice, such as 
nurses and physicians working in the domain of sexual assault. 
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responsibility for their performance, actions and decisions. Employees are publicly 
accountable for their behavior, performance and work products. Many employment 
contracts also include terms requiring forensic practitioners to engage in professional 
development and to actively develop their knowledge and skills.  
 Breaches of legal rules and directions or professional codes may vitiate employment 
contracts. They may expose employees to disciplinary processes and, in some cases, 
dismissal. Breaches may also expose individual forensic scientists to civil suits (e.g. for 
negligence or vindictive prosecution) and in extreme cases criminal prosecution for 
criminal negligence or malfeasance in public office.68 Of significance, in assessing 
performance when things go wrong, the conduct of forensic practitioners will be 
assessed against legal rules, practice directions, professional codes, and contractual 
obligations rather than local traditions and personal beliefs.69 
 
iii. ‘Independent’ consultants 
Forensic practitioners who act in the capacity of consultants may not be (as) constrained 
by formal obligations to employers.70 They nevertheless owe substantial obligations to 
courts and relevant professions (e.g. medicine). They must also comply with formal 
legal rules—such as practice directions—as well as applicable professional codes. To 
the extent that the evidence of consultants is based on new or emerging techniques and 
claimed capabilities they are also obliged to disclose information and to make their 
practices and reasoning transparent. In general, they should avoid trying to conceal 
capabilities (and limitations) in commercial-in-confidence or intellectual property 
claims.71 They should also study their analytical methods, offer evidence to confirm the 
possession of relevant expertise, and be careful about undertaking case-based inquiries 
to confirm the suspicions of investigators. In particular, and this may be a real challenge 
for ‘independent’ consultants, they must endeavour to avoid the influence of suggestion 
and other contextual biases.  
 Ironically, isolated consultants are potentially the least independent (i.e. 
institutionally insulated) of the many different types of expert witness in criminal 
proceedings. Consultants engaged by the state may be particularly vulnerable to a range 
of biases in their largely unregulated exposure to information about the case and the 
suspect(s).72 There may, in addition, be a perceived need to meet the expectations of 
those engaging them (in relation to particular results or the potential for future work).73 
Those contemplating forensic science and medicine work beyond the state’s institutions 
should explain how these and other risks are avoided or managed. Police and 
prosecutors should have strategies in place to manage risks when they instruct forensic 
consultants engaged in sole or small practices. 
                                                         
68 While experts are generally immune from civil liability in Australia, this is not the case in other common law 
jurisdictions, see Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13. 
69 Consider the description of expert witness performance in Gilham v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 131 and the 
blood and textile evidence in Justice Trevor Morling’s, Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Chamberlain 
Convictions: Report (1987). More generally, consider the discussion by B. Wynne, ‘Establishing the rules of law’ 
in R. Smith and B. Wynne (eds), Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in the Law (Routledge, 1989) 23-55. 
70 Consider the certificates and opinions expressed by ‘prosecution’ experts in NSW in R v Tang (2006) 65 
NSWLR 681; Honeysett v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 135 and Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33. 
71 The contention that the proprietary interests should override the interests or ability of criminal justice actors to 
obtain access to information has recently been criticised by the Chief Justice of England. See Lord Thomas, Chief 
Justice of England, ‘Expert evidence and the future of forensic science in criminal trials’, Criminal Bar 
Association Kalisher Lecture (14 October 2014). Accessed (https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/kalisher-lecture-expert-evidence-oct-14.pdf) 24 June 2015. 
72 This is very difficult to accomplish when there are few, or no other, employees. 
73 These may be pronounced where the witness’s livelihood depends on the provision of opinions. 
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D. The professional responsibilities of prosecutors: It’s not all about winning 
Forensic practitioners may enhance their understanding of the duties they owe by 
considering the responsibilities of prosecutors.74 Prosecutors owe a range of obligations, 
starting well before the trial, to the courts, the legal profession and the community. 
Decisions to prosecute (including the particular charges to lay, whether there should be 
joint trials, what to disclose, and what evidence to adduce—e.g. tendency evidence 
where there are heightened admissibility standards and notice provisions) are just a few 
of the many issues they must navigate.  
 Some of the formal legal norms supposedly guiding prosecutions may be lost in the 
adversarialism to which forensic practitioners are exposed through their socialization, 
interactions with police and prosecutors, and experiences in court.75 Nevertheless, in 
relation to prosecutors, two issues are fundamental: (1) obtaining a conviction is not the 
prosecutor’s primary purpose; and, (2) the prosecutor has an obligation to act in a way 
that is fair to the accused (as well as to represent the interests of the state and the 
community).76 These sentiments are embodied in a series of important judgments by the 
highest courts in the common law world. Half a century ago, in one of the most famous 
and widely reproduced statements, the Supreme Court of Canada wrote: 
 
It cannot be over-emphasised that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a 
conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to 
what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts 
is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must also be done 
fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing …77 
 
Similar sentiments form part of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) 
guidelines for prosecutors. 
 
A prosecutor is a ‘minister of justice’. The prosecutor’s principal role is to assist the court to arrive 
at the truth and to do justice between the community and the accused according to law and the 
dictates of fairness.78 
 
These commitments are also embodied in a range of more detailed professional and 
institutional rules such as criminal procedure and bar rules. The New South Wales 
(NSW) Barristers’ Rules, for example, state: 
 
Rule 83.  A prosecutor must fairly assist the court to arrive at the truth, must seek impartially to 
have the whole of the relevant evidence placed intelligibly before the court, and must 
seek to assist the court with adequate submissions of law to enable the law properly 
to be applied to the facts.  
Rule 84.  A prosecutor must not press the prosecution’s case for a conviction beyond a full and 
firm presentation of that case.  
Rule 85.  A prosecutor must not, by language or other conduct, seek to inflame or bias the court 
against the accused.                                                          
74 More generally, see Gary Edmond, ‘(ad)Ministering justice: Expert evidence and the professional 
responsibilities of prosecutors’ (2013) 36 UNSW Law Journal 921-953. 
75 Most forensic practitioners are unable to observe the entire trial. 
76 See also Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules (2015): ‘Rule 4. These Rules are made in the 
belief that: (a) barristers owe their paramount duty to the administration of justice’ and the New South Wales 
Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2013 (Solicitors’ Rules): ‘3.1 A solicitor's duty to the court and the 
administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty.’ 
77 Boucher v The Queen (1954) 110 CCC 263, 270. See also Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935) and 
Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657, 663-664. 
78 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), ‘Prosecution Guidelines of the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions for New South Wales’ (1 June 2007) Guideline 2. 
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Rule 86. A prosecutor must not argue any proposition of fact or law which the prosecutor does 
not believe on reasonable grounds to be capable of contributing to a finding of guilt 
and also to carry weight.  
Rule 87. A prosecutor must disclose to the opponent as soon as practicable all material 
(including the names of and means of finding prospective witnesses in connection 
with such material) available to the prosecutor or of which the prosecutor becomes 
aware which could constitute evidence relevant to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused other than material subject to statutory immunity, unless the prosecutor 
believes on reasonable grounds that such disclosure, or full disclosure, would 
seriously threaten the integrity of the administration of justice in those proceedings or 
the safety of any person.79 
 
 It is clear that, acting as a ‘minister of justice’, the prosecutor is obliged to seek 
truth fairly by prosecuting only as vigorously as the evidence and the system allow. 
The prosecutor cannot ignore the frailties of the evidence, the actual constraints and 
limitations of the system and personnel, or the circumstances attending the individual 
trial (or appeal). Forensic practitioners, as objective independent witnesses, self-
evidently have an obligation to be more impartial than prosecutors, who have the 
burden of advancing the case against the accused. Forensic practitioners should not 
consider prosecutors (or police, or victims or complainants) as their clients, and 
should not aim to secure guilty verdicts. Instead their roles and responsibilities are 
better understood as serving the courts and justice through the provision of impartial 
and reliable evidence, regardless of where it leads. 
 Conventionally, prosecutors have exhibited a tendency to adduce forensic science 
and medicine evidence and leave the defence—through cross-examination and, perhaps, 
rebuttal evidence and requests for directions and warnings—to identify and explain 
weaknesses and limitations. Directly or indirectly (e.g. through suggestion and a failure 
to disabuse), prosecutors may encourage forensic practitioners to assist in this 
endeavour through imagined alignment and support for non-disclosure, non-
transparency, and even a degree of partisan obtuseness. In relation to forensic science 
and medicine evidence, legal rules and professional obligations are inconsistent with 
this kind of approach. Prosecutors should obtain information about limitations and 
oversights with expert opinion evidence, insist that expert reports are compliant with 
jurisdictions rules (e.g. practice directions and codes of conduct) and disclose these 
compliant reports to opposing parties.80 Prosecutors should not omit non-trivial 
limitations or leave them to the defence to tease out and explain during the course of 
adversarial proceedings.81  
 Forensic practitioners must assist prosecutors to fulfill these important 
responsibilities. Prosecutors and forensic practitioners have shared obligations to 
provide more comprehensive accounts of the evidence in reports and, where 
appropriate, in oral testimony. The fact that prosecutors (and solicitors and others 
advising police) may not require forensic practitioners to comply in good faith with the 
terms of practice directions and codes is not a credible excuse for non-compliance.82                                                         
79 Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015. 
80 Obiter in Velevski v The Queen (2002) 187 ALR 233, around not needing to disclose and explain limitations 
with expert evidence, by Gummow and Callinan JJ, appears inconsistent with contemporary Barristers’ rules and 
practice directions, as well as admissibility jurisprudence focused on ‘knowledge’. 
81 Prosecutors should not treat methodological concerns as trivial and claim that experience or past practice 
somehow compensate for these deficiencies. In plea bargains, prosecutors and others should not overstate the 
strength of the evidence against the accused. Similarly, investigators should not do this during interviews, as this 
may affect the admissibility of any admissions, see UEL s90. 
82 Lawyers, especially those advising police and forensic scientists, have tended to recommend, or persist with, 
limited disclosure and a lack of transparency. Such advice is inconsistent with formal rules and professional 
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Forensic practitioners should comply with formal rules regardless of prosecutorial 
suggestion or importunity. 
 If prosecutors and forensic practitioners do not clearly refer to validation studies, 
limitations, error rates and controversies, then the defence, judges and the tribunal of 
fact will probably not find out about them.83 In many cases, defence lawyers are not 
adequately resourced, and perhaps not sufficiently technically literate to recognise, let 
alone convey, significant frailties with forensic science and medicine evidence. Even 
where defence lawyers are sensitized to methodological limitations, current rules make 
clear that it is not their responsibility to raise them unilaterally.84  
 Prosecutors are conventionally understood as model litigants. As a representative of 
the state and the community, there are special (i.e. high) expectations regarding their 
conduct.85 Although, it is not conventionally stated, there must be analogous 
expectations on forensic practitioners working for (or consulted by) the state. Forensic 
practitioners working for the state are model expert witnesses. They must comply with 
practice directions and professional codes and maintain the highest professional 
standards. 
 
 
4. The practical implications of disclosure, transparency, epistemic modesty and 
impartiality 
In order to provide detailed answers to many of the questions posed in HTCE, in most 
instances what is required is simply research or additional research. The possibilities for 
research are endless, so it is imperative to undertake research that addresses 
fundamental issues first—such as whether or how well a technique works, and how 
much better forensic practitioners perform at specific tasks compared to ordinary 
persons. This is the kind of information that ought to provide grounds for determining 
whether opinions are based on ‘specialised knowledge’ and whether they can actually 
assist the tribunal of fact. Beyond admissibility, this information provides the judge and 
jury with means of assessing the probative value (i.e. weight) of the evidence. The jury 
are unable to do much with ipse dixit—regardless of the practitioner’s confidence, 
experience or historical legal practice. 
 In the following sub-sections, in the shadow of the need for greater disclosure, 
transparency, epistemic modesty and impartiality, underpinned by legal rules and 
professional obligations, we endeavour to consider what might to be said in response to 
the kinds of questions raised in HTCE. We consider responses ranging from 
circumstances where validation studies have been undertaken, or some kind of 
indicative error rate can be generated, to conditions where knowledge is quite limited 
and forensic practitioners are not conversant or confident with scientific research 
methods that would enable them to evaluate their techniques and conclusions. 
 
A. Validation studies, proficiency tests and error 
                                                                                                                                                              
obligations. Consequently, the reports currently prepared by forensic scientists in many Australian jurisdictions are 
inconsistent with the formal expectations in professional codes and practice directions. 
83 Moreover, it is more likely that limitations (including serious methodological and technical issues) will be seen 
as trivial or motivated if raised by the defence rather than introduced and explained by the prosecutor. 
84 This is analogous to the need for the prosecution to call all material witnesses so they can be cross-examined by 
the defence. Problems and limitations with forensic science evidence should be raised by the state, so the defence 
knows about them and can explore them if this is considered appropriate. 
85 More is expected of prosecutors than other lawyers. They are required to act in conformity with professional 
duties and legal rules. 
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When responding to questions about validation (or performance) studies, answers will 
be dependent on the domain and the technique. In line with professional responsibilities 
to be conversant with contemporary research and developments, forensic practitioners 
should adapt practices and reporting to make them consistent with relevant studies. 
Some areas of forensic science and some techniques are well-supported scientifically 
(e.g. DNA profiling and drug analysis), others less so (e.g. bite marks and forensic gait 
analysis). Over time most areas of forensic science and medicine should undergo 
evaluation, standardization, and reform. The upshot is that forensic practitioners need to 
be conversant with and, where appropriate ,respond to, scientific literatures relevant to 
their techniques, practices and abilities. Research and its implications, positive or 
negative, should be taken seriously and referenced in reports and testimony. Practices, 
analyses and conclusions, along with the form of expression, should be guided by 
scientific studies. The absence of appropriate research should manifest in formal 
disclosure, genuine epistemic modesty and occasionally by vacating the ‘field’. 
 
i. No studies available 
Validation (and performance) studies provide the appropriate framework to assess 
abilities and levels of performance—i.e. generate relevant ‘knowledge’ about 
techniques and performances.86 Where there are no independent studies supporting the 
validity and reliability of a technique, this should be disclosed in clear terms in reports 
and made conspicuous in oral testimony. It must be appreciated that bare disclosure—
that a technique has not been evaluated—does not provide the means of assessing the 
technique or the performance of a practitioner. That is, the opinion is effectively 
subjective (i.e. speculative) and the information required to make sense of it is not 
available.87 
 In the absence of validation, ‘expert’ reports should explain what was done in a 
transparent manner. Forensic practitioners should be slow to suggest that validation 
studies are unnecessary or impossible, or that the lack of validation studies can be 
overcome through a practitioner’s experience or training. This is not to suggest that 
untested forensic practitioners are without abilities, but rather, that in the absence of 
testing, we do not know how well forensic practitioners perform. It may be that, like 
latent fingerprint examiners comparing prints, practitioners generally perform very well. 
In the absence of testing, however, it is antithetical to the state’s burden of proof in 
criminal proceedings to assume that they do. Unacknowledged uncertainty is likely to 
lead to over-valuation, thereby compromising the fairness of proceedings and 
threatening the burden and standard of proof. 
 Finally, it should be recognized that for some practices (and expressions) it is 
unlikely that supportive research will ever be forthcoming. No scientific studies will 
provide support for the ability to identify a person or object to the exclusion of all 
others.88 This means that some forensic practitioners are not reporting opinions in ways 
that reflect actual (i.e. known) abilities or operating in ways that are inconsistent with 
the methods available to (and recommended by) mainstream scientists—notably,                                                         
86 Daubert and Tuite suggest that the trustworthiness or ‘reliability’ of forensic science evidence should be 
demonstrated by evidence of validity. 
87 Even consistency with other evidence and apparent plausibility may not be particularly useful here. See G. 
Edmond, R. Searston, J. Tangen and I. Dror, ‘Contextual bias and cross-contamination in the forensic sciences: 
The corrosive implications for investigations, plea bargains, trials and appeals’ (2015) 14 Law, Probability & Risk 
1. 
88 See Simon Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001) chapter 11; Saks and Koehler, ‘The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic 
Science’; Cole, ‘Forensics without Uniqueness, Conclusions without Individualization’. 
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statisticians, engineers, psychologists and biomedical researchers.89 This practice should 
be rectified and, in the interim, discordance with authoritative recommendations should 
be acknowledged. 
 
ii. Where studies exist 
Some areas of forensic science will be able to respond positively to the kinds of 
questions posed in HTCE. Many areas of analytical chemistry, biology (particularly 
around DNA profiling) and some aspects of latent fingerprint comparison, for example, 
have a substantial research base or studies that enable quite positive, even detailed, 
responses to many of the questions posed in HTCE. Other techniques and practices, 
however, have not been subjected to formal evaluation. Moreover, many so-called 
‘studies’ are not actually the kinds of experimental evaluation associated with 
validation. In some disciplines, there has been a reliance on laboratory-based 
proficiency tests and case-based simulations as proxies for validation studies. Despite 
the name, commercial proficiency tests are not necessarily genuine tests of proficiency. 
Many ‘proficiency tests’ (e.g., those offered by Collaborative Testing Services, Inc.) do 
not assess the validity and reliability of techniques or the proficiency of the practitioners 
who use them.90 Moreover, they provide little insight into whether forensic practitioners 
exhibit superior performance to laypersons (i.e. possess more than ‘common 
knowledge’) and whether their opinions are based on ‘specialised knowledge’ related to 
‘training, study or experience’.91 Without independent proof that the technique can be 
applied consistently and reliably across cases and practitioners, along with insight into 
the impact of specific variables on the potential for error, it is difficult to use proficiency 
tests and case-based reconstructions as validation.  
 Obviously, it is not possible to test every scenario that might be encountered in 
casework or to accurately anticipate analytical requirements in the future. Nevertheless, 
testing the underlying principles and specific techniques on materials that are 
representative of those encountered in routine casework is fundamental to attempts to 
understand the value of techniques and opinions. Empirical assessment of practitioners’ 
abilities to identify features and characteristics within ‘traces’, to determine similarity or 
dissimilarity, and to make an assessment of the support provided to competing 
propositions, provide means of approaching the assessment of the probative value of 
opinions.   
 Given that cases will continually generate new permutations and possibilities not 
anticipated or studied, full validation of all techniques and processes is not a viable goal. 
What does this mean for practitioners’ obligations? In terms consistent with the goals of 
transparency, disclosure, epistemic modesty and impartiality, forensic practitioners 
should make clear the kinds of studies that have been undertaken, their applicability and 
limitations. They should disclose when studies have not been undertaken. There are                                                         
89 e.g. NAS report. 
90 In fact, Collaborative Testing Services acknowledges that their tests are not indicative of practitioner 
performance by including the following disclaimer in every report: ‘This report contains the data received from the 
participants in this test. Since these participants are located in many countries around the world, and it is their 
option how the samples are to be used (e.g., training exercise, known or blind proficiency testing, research and 
development of new techniques, etc.), the results compiled in the Summary Report are not intended to be an 
overview of the quality of work performed in the profession and cannot be interpreted as such. The Summary 
Comments are included for the benefit of participants to assist with maintaining or enhancing the quality of their 
results. These comments are not intended to reflect the general state of the art within the profession. 
(<http://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/3424_Web.pdf>, see Vokey, J. R., Tangen, J. M., & Cole, S. A. 
(2009). On the preliminary psychophysics of fingerprint identification. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 62(5), 1023-1040; Thompson, M. B., Tangen, J. M., & McCarthy, D. J. (2013). Expertise in 
fingerprint identification. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(6), 1519-1530.) 
91 See e.g. UEL ss 55, 56, 79(1), 135, 137. 
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some areas where studies are unlikely, and there is little hope, certainly in the short to 
medium term, of conducting studies that are case specific. Conversely, some areas will 
be sufficiently significant or destabilizing to warrant immediate attention. A prominent 
example is research into the transfer (i.e., secondary, tertiary and so on) of DNA. Until 
such supplementary studies are undertaken, when asked about specific scenarios where 
the research is incomplete or ambiguous, forensic practitioners should indicate that they 
are speculating (even if on apparently reasonable grounds) and that their opinion and its 
strength should, consistent with the need for transparency, epistemic modesty and 
impartiality, embody uncertainties that are both known and unknown. 
 
iii. Small numbers of studies and weak studies 
As forensic scientists and scientists begin to increase the volume of validation research, 
there will be a need for forensic practitioners, lawyers and courts (and jurors) to make 
sense of the emerging results. Many forensic sciences, particularly the pattern evidence 
disciplines, have techniques comprising many discrete steps; often embedded in larger 
processes. Consequently, any study will be limited in its scope and generalisability, 
especially where an assumption is made regarding the larger process. No single study 
will validate the entirety of a discipline’s claims and, given the large number of 
variables typically associated with a forensic technique, the external validity of any 
study may be open to legitimate dispute.92 
 Several recent and small-scale studies, relating to image comparison (so-called facial 
mapping and forensic gait comparison), concluded that because practitioners (i.e. 
anatomists, physical anthropologists and podiatrists) performed above chance or better 
than the general public, on that basis their opinions ought to be received in criminal 
proceedings.93 This, however, does not necessarily follow. Some of these studies were 
weak, featuring less than a dozen subjects (and not always compared to the performance 
of laypersons). Courts will be required to make policy decisions about the levels of 
accuracy, error and risk they are willing to tolerate, given the various personnel, costs 
and dangers associated with admitting the opinions of those legally recognised as 
experts.94 Courts must be careful to avoid relying too heavily on weak, poorly designed 
and one-off studies.  
 For any single published study, the non-trivial question is whether it is adequate in 
terms of design, control, fidelity, quality, analysis, size, and so forth. When it comes to 
some of the first generation of studies, that test general capabilities—i.e. expertise in a 
particular domain—the basic ability of practitioners should be assessed and compared to 
novices before investigating narrower questions. It is essential that practitioners be 
aware of the potential for error, and avoid the temptation to ‘borrow’ validity from 
research where techniques were applied in different conditions. As practitioners move 
from their area of demonstrated ability—based on formal evaluation of the technique 
and proficiency testing—they should be fully transparent and circumspect.                                                         
92 There is a paucity of tests that benchmark examiner performance against the population at large reported in the 
scientific literature, but those that do exist show significant variability in the accuracy of judgments from one 
trained examiner to the next. See Ulery et al, ‘Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent fingerprint decisions’; 
White et al, ‘Perceptual expertise in forensic facial image comparison’. 
93 Consider e.g. Carol Wilkinson and Richard Evans ‘Are facial image analysis experts any better than the general 
public at identifying individuals from CCTV images?’ (2009) 49 Science & Justice 191; I. Birch, L. Raymond, A. 
Christou, M. Fernando, N. Harrison and F. Paul, ‘The identification of individuals by observational gait analysis 
using closed circuit television footage’ (2013) 53 Science and Justice 339; I. Birch, W. Vernon, G. Burrow and J. 
Walker, ‘The effect of frame rate on the ability of experienced gait analysts to identify characteristics of gait from 
closed circuit television footage’ (2014) 54 Science and Justice 159. 
94 Policy decisions should be informed by a range of insights, including studies on the performance of laypersons 
with statistics and probabilities. Cf Aytugrul v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 170. 
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 In general, when assessing the value of the contribution made by any study the 
fundamental issue of experimental power should be at the forefront. The explanatory 
‘power’ of an experiment is derived from both the number of participants in the 
experiment, and the number of decisions those participants are asked to make (i.e. the 
number of trials). Where large numbers of participants can be recruited, relatively small 
numbers of trials are required from each participant to obtain a robust estimate of ‘true’ 
performance. However, where small numbers of participants are available, as in many 
areas of forensic science, many trials are required. Studies with only 10 or 20 
participants completing only one or two trials will shed limited light on the ability being 
assessed and may need to be treated with particular caution. 
 The need for caution is accentuated if experiments are poorly designed, where, for 
example: valid alternative explanations are not ruled out, experimental procedures do 
not preserve the independence of respondents, or issues relating to human agency in 
experimental trials are not carefully managed. To some extent these problems can be 
avoided through collaboration. Studies conducted by multidisciplinary groups, 
published in peer reviewed journals (particularly in mainstream science journals), and 
successfully presented at national and international conferences, will typically be 
relatively robust. Public institutions involved in the production of forensic science and 
medicine evidence should publish their validation studies following independent peer 
review.95 Such studies will tend to be more resilient than studies designed and 
conducted by: isolated groups; groups with vested interests in outcomes of a particular 
kind (rather than knowledge in general); groups with limited expertise in conducting 
human research; and, groups who do not disseminate their research among broader 
scholarly communities.  
 Norms and professional obligations require scientists to engage with pre-existing 
research and to characterize it accurately. Similarly, forensic practitioners have legal 
and professional obligations to reference relevant scientific literatures and to describe 
them in a balanced manner. Practitioners should not cherry-pick favourable research or 
exaggerate the value of small or poorly designed studies if these do not provide the 
kinds of evidence that is required to support the particular technique, interpretation or 
expression.  
 
iv. Detailed questions about validation studies and how to validate 
What should a forensic practitioner say if asked detailed questions about what validation 
is, how to conduct a validation study, or what available research reveals, and they are 
not really sure? Practioners should always answer honestly and try to be as clear as 
possible. They should acknowledge uncertainties and, if appropriate, respond to 
questions with ‘I do not know’ or ‘That is not part of my expertise’. There is no shame 
(or embarrassment) in explaining that you are a practitioner who uses the technique(s) 
taught to you and that you do not fully understand all of the underlying processes and 
assumptions—although it is important to recognise that comprehension and 
sophistication are generally desirable and often required by professional codes and 
employers.96 Always stay within the appropriate realm of expertise (where there is                                                         
95 For a discussion of the risks and benefits of using ‘insiders’ vs ‘outsiders’ to review expert practices, see Trisha 
Greenhalgh How to Read a Paper: The Basics of Evidence-Based Medicine (Oxford: BMJI Books, 5th ed 2014) at 
117-8 and sources cited therein. 
96 Practitioners and technicians should be able to identify and refer to relevant validation studies and be aware of 
issues with human factors. See e.g. NIST report, Recommendation 6.3: ‘A testifying expert should be familiar with 
the literature related to error rates. A testifying expert should be prepared to describe the steps taken in the 
examination process to reduce the risk of observational and judgmental error. The expert should not state that 
errors are inherently impossible or that a method inherently has a zero error rate.’ 
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demonstrable knowledge), and let others answer such questions if pressed and they are 
beyond your abilities. If the defence or judge requires additional information then the 
prosecutor should call supplementary witnesses with domain relevant or methodological 
expertise.97 These will usually be senior scientists and/or managers from the institution. 
 
v. Collaboration on validation and other studies 
Forensic practitioners may not have relevant experience, methodological skills, 
infrastructure, time and resources to conduct scientific experiments comparing expert 
and novice accuracy, measuring validity and reliability, or isolating the factors that 
influence expert decision-making.98 Other groups, such as research scientists, may be 
well positioned to assist. Cognitive scientists, for example, specialize in phenomena 
such as human learning, memory, performance, perception, attention, decision-
making, and reasoning. University-based research scientists in Australia routinely 
collaborate with industry partners across a variety of fields and recently these 
partnerships have extended to include studies of fingerprints and face matching.99 
Such collaborations may involve analysing practices and protocols in routine 
casework; designing and participating in experiments; disseminating findings in 
presentations and training, reports, and peer-reviewed journals; and improving 
institutional policies and practices. This kind of research can make important 
contributions to the evidence-base of the discipline, enhance efficiency and 
performance, and be invoked in response to emerging legal interest in ‘knowledge’. 
 
vi. Overview 
Validation and proficiency studies provide information required by decision makers 
when determining if an opinion can rationally assist the resolution of disputed facts and 
what weight it might be given.100 Forensic practitioners should remain firmly within the 
realms of demonstrable expertise and be reluctant to move into a penumbra of 
convention, belief, and speculation, at least without a heavy dose of epistemic modesty. 
Practitioners should make it clear to the court if their opinions are not well-supported by 
experimental studies. 
 As experimental studies contribute to the evidence-base of their domain, forensic 
practitioners may have to modify traditional practices (e.g. to take account of human 
factors) and forms of expression (e.g. move to probabilistic approaches; including 
statements that incorporate alternative hypotheses). In some cases validation studies 
might suggest that the probative value of opinion evidence is higher than routinely 
                                                        
97 See some of the examples in Simon Cole, ‘A Cautionary Tale about Cautionary Tales about Intervention’ (2009) 
16 Organization 121. 
98 Tangen, J. M. (2013). Identification personified. Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, 45(3), 315-322. 
99 On fingerprints, see Donaldson, S. I., Berger, D. E., & Pezdek, K. (Eds.). (2012). Applied psychology: New 
frontiers and rewarding careers. Psychology Press; Tangen, J. M., Thompson, M. B., & McCarthy, D. J. (2011). 
Identifying fingerprint expertise. Psychological Science, 22(8), 995-997; Busey, T. A., & Parada, F. J. (2010). The 
nature of expertise in fingerprint examiners. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 17(2), 155-160; Dror, I. E., Charlton, 
D., & Péron, A. E. (2006). Contextual information renders experts vulnerable to making erroneous identifications. 
Forensic science international, 156(1), 74-78; Erlikhman, G., Ghose, T., Garrigan, P., Mnookin, J., Dror, I., 
Charleton, D., & Kellman, P. (2013). Fingerprint Matching Expertise and its Determinants. Journal of Vision, 
13(9), 51-51. On faces, see e.g., Kemp, R., Towell, N., & Pike, G. (1997). When seeing should not be believing: 
Photographs, credit cards and fraud. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11(3), 211-222; White, D., Kemp, R. I., 
Jenkins, R., Matheson, M., & Burton, A. M. (2014). Passport officers’ errors in face matching. PloS ONE, 9(8), 
e103510; Burton, A. M., Kramer, R. S., Ritchie, K. L., & Jenkins, R. (in press). Identity from variation: 
Representations of faces derived from multiple instances. Cognitive Science. 
100 The word ‘rationallly’ is taken from the meaning of relevance in the Uniform Evidence Law, ss55, 56. 
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claimed (or allowed) in criminal proceedings. In other cases research may require 
traditional practices and expressions to be moderated and even abandoned.101  
 More than ever before, techniques used by forensic practitioners are visible to 
attentive research scientists. Forensic practitioners should endeavour to engage with the 
concerns and recommendations of attentive audiences, and to document, in good faith, 
limitations, concerns and controversies. This will demonstrate an impartial orientation 
and provide important resources for the prosecution and defence as they endeavour to 
grapple with the complexities of the forensic science evidence in the context of more 
expansive evidentiary arrays.  
 Techniques and opinions should not be grounded merely on training, experience or 
legal acceptance. Allowing a very experienced (and sometimes highly credentialed) 
forensic practitioner to speculate, hypothesize, or guess in realms where they are not 
known to possess actual expertise raises obvious risks to the factual accuracy and 
fairness of the trial. 
 
B. Error rates, limitations and uncertainties 
All expert opinions, expressed in a report or orally, should incorporate a clear indication 
of limitations, uncertainties and/or a statement addressing the potential for error. An 
expert opinion that does not index the ‘knowledge’ on which it is grounded and disclose 
known limitations is incomplete. It does not comply with admissibility rules, creates a 
serious risk of being misunderstood, and contravenes the expert’s overriding duty to 
impartially assist the court.102 
 Once again, the appropriate response is to provide useful information about the limits 
of the technique or process behind the opinion. In many cases such information will be 
extracted from an experiment, or series of experiments, where the technique and 
practitioner have been tested against ground truth—i.e. a known result. As a matter of 
experimental design, ecological validity may have been sacrificed in order to isolate 
task components and associated abilities. For example, experts might be asked to make 
time-limited decisions, to forego collaborative opinion forming, have limited access to 
databases, tools or techniques, or may be required to provide binary (e.g. yes/no) 
responses rather than use their specialised conclusion scales. While such restrictions 
may impinge on ecological validity, these experiments nevertheless provide useful 
frameworks through which to assess abilities and opinions.103 Estimates of error may 
need to be qualified or explained in the context of a specific case, but the need to 
extrapolate from the general (to the individual, or specific) is unavoidable.104 
 However qualified, experimental results on the limitations of forensic techniques 
need to be made available to the court. Without some indication of error (and other 
limitations), it may be difficult, perhaps very difficult, to assess the value of a 
practitioner’s opinion.105 Is, for example, the performance of the forensic practitioner                                                         
101 Some techniques and forms of reporting have been abandoned altogether. Consider the recent treatment of 
bullet lead comparison, bite marks, and microscopic hair comparisons, for example: NRC, Forensic Analysis 
Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004) and FBI/DOJ, Microscopic 
Hair Comparison Analysis Review at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/scientific-analysis/fbi-doj-microscopic-
hair-comparison-analysis-review (accessed 15 August 2015). 
102 The fact that any error rate will be somewhat artificial, and might not capture the precise conditions of the 
analysis is not an excuse. Awareness of this issue did not prevent the NAS and other groups insisting that these 
should be determined: NAS Report, 184, 122. 
103 Moreover, in many comparison practices, expertise inheres in the analyst rather than these other things, even if 
they may enhance the practices. 
104 David Faigman, John Monahan and Christopher Slobogin, ‘Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific 
Expert Testimony’ (2014) 81 University of Chicago Law Review 417. 
105 The lack of research might prevent apporpirate qualifications being made. 
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better than a layperson (making the evidence relevant) and if so how much better?106 
And, how do we know? Is the task easy or difficult? Do practitioners make mistakes? 
How often? In what circumstances does the technique work well or work poorly? Is this 
assay typical of the kind of procedures performed by this practitioner? Here, the 
invocation of previous legal recognition, like recourse to long experience and personal 
confidence, may be distracting. In the absence of information about limitations derived 
from empirical studies, opinions may be no more than bare assertion—i.e. ipse dixit. 
 The generation of information about error (and other limitations with a technique) is, 
undoubtedly, a complicated problem, that may require trade-offs and compromises. 
Error rates that map precisely onto the complex and varied circumstances of a sui 
generis case are generally unattainable. Instead, error rates will generally be oriented 
toward the technique, perhaps the laboratory, rather than the individual practitioner or 
the circumstances of a specific prosecution. Courts should expect to be using these 
kinds of base rates and then to extrapolate from the general to the specific with 
information about the value of techniques (and proficiency).107 
 One attempt to wrestle with some of these challenging issues is the ‘Guide to 
Forensic Testimony: Fingerprints’, advanced by Edmond, Thompson and Tangen.108 
These authors proposed a way of refining the reporting and presentation of latent 
fingerprint evidence in response to emerging criticisms, a few important preliminary 
studies, and the immediate needs of criminal justice systems that continue to investigate 
and prosecute relying on latent fingerprint evidence.109 They proposed appending the 
following to a ‘match’ report. 
 
A Guide to Forensic Testimony: Fingerprints 
•  A decision about whether two fingerprints match or not is based on the judgment of a human 
examiner, not a computer. 
•  There are several documented cases where an examiner has incorrectly said that two prints 
‘match’ when they actually came from two different people.  
•  Laboratory-based experiments suggest that errors of this sort happen infrequently (around 1% 
of the time). In practice, however, it is unknown how often examiners say that two 
fingerprints match when they actually come from two different people. 
•  Without specific evidence, it cannot be known whether an error has occurred in a particular 
case.110 
 
 The authors acknowledge that the ‘Guide’ is a compromise and has limitations. 
However, it seems an improvement on the traditional way of reporting latent fingerprint 
evidence in reports and expert certificates. Historically, latent fingerprint examiners 
have equated a ‘match’ with positive identification of a person. Ordinarily there is little 
explanation of how this conclusion was reached, whether there was disagreement 
between examiners, whether it was subject to a meaningful review and what that 
involved, and there is almost never any reference to the risk of error in reports or oral 
testimony. These conventional reporting practices systematically exaggerate the                                                         
106 More generally, how much better than a layperson should an ‘expert’ typically perform before the various risks 
and dangers associated with expert opinions are imposed on the trial? This is a policy issue that warrants 
consideration by appellate courts. 
107 David Faigman, John Monahan and Christopher Slobogin, ‘Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific 
Expert Testimony’ (2014) 81 University of Chicago Law Review 417. 
108 Edmond, Thompson & Tangen, ‘A Guide to Interpreting Forensic Testimony: Scientific Approaches to 
Fingerprint Evidence’ (2013) 12 Law, Probability and Risk. 
109 The ‘Guide’ is obviously dated in the sense it will require modification and revision. 
110 Edmond, Thompson & Tangen, ‘A Guide to Interpreting Forensic Testimony, 11. In many cases a 2 x 2 table 
will provide a useful indication of the proportion of correct results and incorrect results and the incidence of 
different types of errors in specific processes, thereby providing a useful means of approaching the assessment of a 
particular result. 
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probative value of the opinion, privileging the prosecution case and subverting 
fundamental criminal justice values.111  
 By not incorporating limitations, uncertainties and some kind of indication of error, 
the state—through its prosecutors and fingerprint examiners—could be accused of mis-
representing the value of its expert opinion evidence and partisanship.112 The defence 
should not be obliged to somehow identify and explain limitations or persuade the court 
that there is a real world error rate. There always is an error rate and it is incumbent on 
forensic practitioners to provide an indication of its magnitude. If the risk of error is 
small, as they generally appear to be with much latent fingerprint and DNA profiling 
evidence, little will be lost in reporting it.113 The forensic practitioner has a conspicuous 
duty to provide an indicative error rate in order to prevent over-reliance on the opinion. 
 It is improper to suggest that forensic practitioners do not make mistakes.114 The 
scientific and medical literature on human factors indicates that all humans, including 
the most highly-trained scientists and doctors, make mistakes.115  The fact that 
practitioners are not aware, or do not believe, that they have made a mistake does not 
mean performance is error free. In criminal justice systems, ground truth is generally 
inaccessible. Indicative error rates enable the court to assess expert opinion evidence.116 
Even a base-rate error that is not perfectly suited to the particular case will usually be 
better than omission or denial and the resulting risk of misunderstanding and 
overvaluation.  
 
C. Peer review and verification 
Forensic practitioners should try to avoid suggesting that peer review or other 
verification procedures in themselves can somehow overcome or repair errors and 
limitations. Peer review and verification may help to reduce errors and are more likely 
to do so when they are conducted in specific conditions—such as where techniques are 
known to be valid and review is blind—see Section 4.E.117 However, where peer review 
and verification are applied to techniques of unknown validity, or where the reviewer is 
exposed to the earlier result (or the desired result) or other suggestive information, peer 
review and verification may provide little improvement or improvement of unknown 
value. As things stand, we have relatively limited information about the value of review 
processes in relation to most of the forensic sciences.118                                                         
111 See NAS Report, 142; The Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry, Recommendations 1 and 3; NIST report, 
Recommendation 3.7. 
112 This applies to latent fingerprints, DNA evidence, ballistics and so on. 
113  The Netherlands Forensic Institute is one of the few to openly acknowledge errors in biological trace 
analysis, with publication of department-wide error rates: A. Kloosterman et al, ‘Error rates in forensic DNA 
analysis: definition, numbers, impact and communication’ (2014) 12 Forensic Science International Genetics 77-
85. The explicit recognition of both method-based and human-derived errors and their impact on the accuracy of 
opinions provided across ~ 450,000 analyses provides empirical data for courts to judge the reliability of DNA 
results from their laboratory. Although the authors acknowledge that the translation from an academic discussion 
around general error rates to application for specific cases is problematic, guidance is provided to courts and 
investigators around errors, and how to request case-specific error analysis.   
114 Practitioners might give reasons why they are confident, but in most cases they cannot be certain that a 
mistakes has not been made. 
115 For example, Kohn, L. T., Corrigan, J. M., & Donaldson, M. S. (Eds.). (2000). To Err Is Human: Building a 
Safer Health System. National Academies Press. 
116 Sometimes error might enable the jury to accommodate inconsistent evidence such as alibis. Consider Frank 
Vincent, Report: Inquiry Into the Circumstances That Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama 
(Victorian Government Printer, May 2010). 
117 This is not how most ‘peer review’ operates within forensic science institutions. 
118 There is a large literature about peer review and its limitations in relation to biomedical publication. See e.g. the 
discussion of peer review and publication in civil litigation in Gary Edmond, ‘Judging the scientific and medical 
literature: Some legal implications of changes to biomedical research and publication’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 523. 
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 Currently, some of the practices presented as ‘peer review’ more closely resemble a 
kind of editorial review than a genuinely independent assessment of a particular process 
or conclusion. For transparency, practitioners should explain what they mean by ‘peer 
review’ in the specific instance. In some cases terms such as ‘looked over’ or ‘proof 
read’ may be more accurate descriptions of institutional practices. 
 
D. Expression of opinions 
The terminology used by forensic scientists in expressing their opinions should be based 
on experimental research. Use of particular terminologies or scales should be 
empirically justified (i.e. linked to validation and, if appropriate, frequency data), 
clearly explained and be comprehensible.  
 The expression of opinions should be derived from what we know about the validity 
of techniques and the proficiency of forensic practitioners. In developing expressions, 
whether quantitative (such as likelihood ratios or frequencies) or qualitative (e.g. the use 
of tables, a range or form of words), forensic practitioners should engage with 
statisticians, science communicators and cognitive scientists.  
 Expression and comprehension are complex domains and those lacking specialist 
knowledge in the area should seek guidance.119 This advice extends to courts. In some 
cases judges may place constraints on what they allow forensic practitioners to say in 
court (e.g. limiting opinions to ‘similarities’).120 Apparently intended to embody and 
convey evidentiary limitations, judge-imposed expressions are often as arbitrary as the 
expressions conventionally employed by forensic practitioners. Experimental studies 
and the insights of cognitive scientists, rather than terms imposed by judges or conjured 
by forensic scientists, especially those steeped in antiquated individualisation (i.e. 
positive identification) traditions, should inform the way opinions are expressed in 
reports and testimony. 
 Forensic practitioners should generally avoid neologisms—such as ‘to a reasonable 
degree of ballistic certainty’ (used in the U.S.)—and be careful about the use of loaded 
terms such as ‘match’, ‘consistent (with)’, ‘similar’ or ‘multiple similarities’, and 
especially ‘cannot exclude’, ‘no differences’, and ‘no significant differences’.121 
 Finally, forensic practitioners should not think that because they are allowed to 
express expert opinions in reports and testimony they are entitled to proffer personal 
opinions unsupported by ‘knowledge’.122 Forensic practitioners cannot avoid 
professional and legal obligations on the basis that they are merely proffering a personal 
opinion. To be admissible, opinions must be wholly or substantially based on 
‘specialised knowledge’. Where opinions are not based on relevant scientific research 
the opinion is not admissible. 
  
E. Human factors and genuine impartiality                                                         
119 Comprehension of reports and testimony is a separate, though obviously related, issue that requires the input of 
judges and cognitive scientists. Forensic scientists should not second-guess what courts might like, unless these 
have been negotiated based on evidence.  
120 See e.g. R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 and R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439. 
121 See e.g. Frank Kaufman Report of the Kaufman Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin 
(Toronto: Queens Printer, 1998). See also NIST Report, 128 and NRC Report, 185; Goudge Report, 433-35. See 
also See Dawn McQuiston-Surrett and Michael Saks, ‘The testimony of forensic identification science: What 
expert 
witnesses say and what factfinders hear’ (2009) 33 Law & Human Behavior 436-453; Kristy Martire et al, 
‘The psychology of interpreting expert evaluative opinions’ (2013) 45 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 
305. 
122 On ‘opinionisation’, see Simon Cole, ‘The “opinionization” of fingerprint evidence’ (2008) 3 BioSocieties 105-
113. 
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Forensic practitioners should be attentive to human factors research and alive to risks of 
implicit bias.123 Institutions responsible for producing forensic science and medicine 
evidence should have policies and practices designed to regulate the kinds of 
information that practitioners are provided with, and where possible their processes 
(especially verification and review) should be designed to avoid biasing evidentiary 
products. When it comes to reports and testimony, forensic practitioners should describe 
the processes that are in place to avoid (or reduce) a range of undesirable exposures, 
such as suggestion and confirmation biases. They should be able to identify and explain 
mitigation strategies, such as selective unmasking or requiring a different practitioner to 
screen exhibits in order to determine what should be tested. Where there are no or few 
processes in place practitioners should disclose this absence. 
 Significantly, forensic practitioners cannot credibly contend that information about 
the case or suggestive practices have not influenced interpretations and decisions, unless 
at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:  
 
(1) the practitioner is shielded (i.e. blinded) from gratuitous information or gradually 
exposed through a staged process that documents exposure and emerging 
interpretations (e.g. sequential unmasking); and/or 
(2) studies confirm that exposures or processes are unlikely to influence a specific type 
of practice (e.g. the comparison of a high quality latent fingerprint with a reference 
print or the interpretation of a ‘simple’ electropherogram).124 
 
If these conditions are not satisfied there will be an unavoidable risk that the 
practitioner’s interpretation will be contaminated. Forensic practitioners cannot 
plausibly contend that knowing about risks enables them (somehow) to overcome their 
effects or take cognitive influences into account. Specific blinding or sequential 
unmasking processes must be designed and implemented to address such risks.125 
 In most cases blinding (or some kind of documented sequential unmasking) will 
enable forensic practitioners and prosecutors to resist the claim that context effects and 
other human factors (e.g. bias as a member of a team or institution) may have exerted 
unintended influence on the opinion.126 Blinding procedures will tend to focus 
practitioners on their task, and the area in which they have demonstrated expertise, and 
will enhance the value of their results. Results obtained in conditions where the 
practitioner knew what was expected or had access to domain irrelevant case 
information—e.g. about the suspect or the results of other techniques—are less 
valuable. That is, the probative value is reduced and the danger of unfair prejudice is 
increased. 
 In consequence, institutions should develop systems to prevent exposing forensic 
practitioners to information or processes that might compromise analysis and review.                                                         
123 Concerns about human factors featured prominently in the NAS report, the NIST report, the Scottish 
Fingerprint Inquiry and their recommendations. 
124 But even these can be difficult as practitioners do not always agree on sufficiency or quality or the number of 
contributors. 
125 See Gary Edmond, Rachel Searston, Jason Tangen & Itiel Dror, ‘Contextual bias and cross-contamination in 
the forensic sciences: The corrosive implications for investigations, plea bargains, trials and appeals’ (2014) 13 
Law, Probability & Risk 1-25. 
126 D. Krane et al, ‘Sequential unmasking: a means of minimizing observer effects in forensic DNA interpretation’ 
(2008) 53 Journal of Forensic Science 1006. It is important to emphasise that we are not suggesting that everyone 
needs to be blinded. Rather, it is just the practitioner undertaking the analyst and perhaps any reviewers. Forensic 
science institutions can manage contextual bias, especially suggestion, through managers (or practitioners) 
determining what needs to be examined and what needs to be known by others in order to undertake rigorous 
analysis. Those regulating access to information are known colloquially as ‘puppet masters’. 
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Where practitioners have been provided with information about the case, expectations 
or other influences, this should be documented and referenced in the forensic 
practitioner’s report. Further, the institution’s response to threats from human factors 
should also be included in a report or be described on a website referenced in reports. It 
should be noted, however, that documentation and disclosure, though important, are 
unable to overcome the problems introduced by inappropriate and gratuitous exposures. 
 Some forensic domains do not appear to have made serious efforts to understand the 
impact that information and suggestive processes may exert on practitioners.127 In fields 
where attempts to shield practitioners are limited or non-existent, the fact that 
practitioners were exposed to suggestive information is not usually documented and the 
risk of evidence being ‘double-counted’ or biased often passes unrecognised.128 We 
accept that blinding may make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to persist with traditional 
practices, in some disciplines. But this calls for re-consideration of the way these 
domains are organised and practiced. What information do the practitioners need to 
perform their analyses? What are they exposed to? Why? And, can practices be re-
organised to avoid some or most of the dangers?129 
 Codes of conduct and legal practice directions uniformly call for experts to be 
impartial or objective in the production and presentation of their evidence. Genuine 
impartiality requires the development of practices and processes that embody desired 
values and protect practitioners (and evidence) from notorious dangers. The failure to 
incorporate human factors research into the practice of forensic science and medicine 
exposes practitioners to criticism that they are biased, or inattentive to the dangers of 
bias, and in breach of fundamental duties to the courts. Genuine impartiality requires the 
adoption and use of processes that facilitate impartial outcomes. This means good faith 
attempts to address notorious risks, as well as disclose limitations, constraints, and 
disagreements.  
 
F. Expert reports 
There is a conspicuous continuity between the substantial subjects raised in HTCE and 
an earlier contribution on the content required in expert reports.130 Expert reports should 
include information that enables a reader to ascertain what was done and to evaluate the 
opinion (or conclusion).131 This is both a condition of legal admissibility (following the 
decisions in HG, Dasreef, Honeysett and Tuite) and required if opinions are to be                                                         
127 Stephen Goudge Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology (Toronto: Queens Printer, 2008). Goudge did not 
recommend, for example, that forensic pathologists should be blinded, but the report does not appear to fully grasp 
the seriousness of the problems. See e.g. I. Dror, D. Charlton & A. Peron, ‘Contextual Information Renders 
Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications’ (2006) 156 Forensic Science International 74. 
128 See Edmond et al, ‘Contextual bias and cross-contamination in the forensic sciences’; Emma Cunliffe, Murder, 
Medicine & Motherhood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). Double-counting may occur when the same information 
informs the ‘expert’ interpretation and is also presented to the tribunal of fact as independent evidence for them to 
consider. The evidence might be counted twice, and often the tribunal may be oblivious to the fact that the 
information might have influenced (perhaps inappropriately or inadvertently) the resulting ‘expert’ opinion. 
Examples include a fire investigator knowing about a recent rise in insurance cover when trying to determine the 
cause of a fire, or a forensic pathologist knowing about enmity between a married couple or the demographics of 
parents when examining the body of a wife or child, respectively, to determine cause of death. 
129 The published literature offers many suggestions for institutional processes to reduce the risks of bias.  See for 
example Itiel E. Dror et al, ‘Context Management Toolbox: A Linear Sequential Unmasking (LSU) approach for 
minimizing contextual bias in forensic decision making’ (2015) Journal of Forensic Sciences online first (18 June 
2015). 
130 See Bryan Found and Gary Edmond and others, ‘Reporting on the comparison and interpretation of pattern 
evidence’ (2012) 44 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 193-196. The NAS, NIST and Goudge reports all list 
the kinds of information that should be included in an expert report. See the discussion in Edmond, ‘What lawyers 
should know about the forensic “sciences”’. 
131 See Section 3.B and C and the codes and practice directions discussed there. 
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rationally evaluated (recall Davie).132 In recent decades these expectations have also 
been embodied in codes of conduct and/or procedural rules in many jurisdictions. 
Though not necessarily expressed in technical terms, codes and procedural rules require 
reports to include information pertaining to validation, reliability, proficiency, 
uncertainty and limitations, human factors, necessary qualifications, ongoing 
controversy and so on—see Section 3.B. The provision of this information, will make 
the practitioner compliant with formal expectations. More importantly, it will make the 
opinion evidence transparent and comprehensible. For model experts, aspiring to act 
impartially as servants of the court, the failure to provide such information is 
inexcusable. 
 Expert reports should incorporate appropriate information—reflecting the obligation 
to act as an impartial expert, sworn to tell the ‘whole truth’ and with an overriding duty 
to assist the court. This requires that sufficient information be included to explain: what 
information was provided to the practitioner (or what the practitioner learnt from 
examining the scene); what was requested of the practitioner; the work carried out by 
the practitioner, along with an explanation of the technique and the resulting opinion; 
evidence that supports the technique (i.e. ‘knowledge’); the proficiency of the 
practitioner; means of assessing the technique and conclusion (e.g. error rates); along 
with insight into relevant standards, controversies, limitations, and assumptions.133  
 An expert report should be sufficient to enable another expert or scientist to make a 
clear assessment of the analysis and conclusion. It should also provide materials that 
enable a non-expert to undertake further research or seek independent advice. 
Admittedly, the provision of such information may pose practical problems. It may 
require institutions to make additional materials available electronically on a website or, 
less desirably, upon request. It might, alternatively, necessitate production of a short or 
summary report, in conjunction with a longer report that is largely composed of 
standardised text describing techniques and practices. Not every detail needs to be 
included in a report. The goal is to disclose useful information in a fair-minded (i.e. 
impartial) and transparent manner, not to overwhelm prosecutors, defence lawyers and 
the occasional scientist reviewing the material, with information of marginal value.  
 Assessing the conduct and performance of forensic practitioners should be directed 
to the quality of reports, the propriety of opinions, and the consistency of testimony 
with available scientific research and authoritative recommendations. These are clearly 
more appropriate indicia of expert performance than convictions or successful resistance 
to (often perfunctory) cross-examination.134 
 
G. What to say in response to questions based on authoritative reports (e.g. Goudge, 
NAS, NIST, McKie and the English Law Commission) 
There are more and more reports and reviews of forensic science and medicine that 
might be raised during cross-examination. These introduce a wide range of issues of 
varying degrees of seriousness and applicability. Some of these interventions, for 
example the NAS report, are oriented to specific jurisdictions (in the U.S.) but quite 
general in scope. Others, such as the NIST report on human factors in latent fingerprint 
examination, are more tightly focused in their subject matter, though also imbued with                                                         
132 Davie v Lord Provost, Magistrates and Counsellors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34. 
133 Reports should also document what the forensic practitioner was told or exposed to and what was requested. 
This should include information passed during informal exchanges and inadvertently. 
134 Institutions should focus on whether expert reports are consistent with expectations and formal legal 
requirements. Similarly, testimony should occasionally be independently reviewed to determine if what was said in 
court is consistent with the report and what is known. 
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broader significance. Below, we have endeavoured to canvass a range of potential 
reactions to these reports and some of the associated issues. 
 
1. The criticisms only apply to the US or the UK or Canada. Such responses may be 
more or less accurate, but the main issue is whether the forensic practitioner’s 
evidence is underpinned by relevant research (particularly validation or 
performance studies). Jurisdictional differences, even substantial differences around 
accreditation, certification (and training) and standardisation, for example, may not 
overcome: a lack of research; uncertainty about the rate of error; uncertainty about 
actual proficiency; and, inattention to human factors. 
2. We do things (fundamentally) differently. In some cases this is not accurate, or the 
differences are not significant or not known to be significant (see 1, above). 
Differences in practice between jurisdictions may be less important than the 
availability of experimental research supporting what is done domestically. 
3. We already have standards and accreditation in place. The issue here is whether 
these are based on experimental research or merely formalisations of conventional 
practices and beliefs. Moreover, are practices explained and standards identified 
and complied with?135 
4. Our forensic practitioners are much better trained. That may be true and training 
would generally seem to be desirable, especially if it involves formal scientific and 
technical instruction in universities.136 The issue is how such training relates to 
validity, reliability and proficiency. We need research to answer the question of 
whether this matters. Some emerging research suggests, perhaps counter-
intuitively, that the relationship between training/experience and performance is not 
linear.137 Abilities do not necessarily improve over time. This means that we cannot 
assume that the most experienced forensic practitioners will necessarily be the most 
proficient. (Such insights may have serious implications for the selection of 
forensic practitioners, training and review mechanisms—see Section 4.A.v). 
5. The recommendations are normative or aspirational. There may be some truth to 
this, but many of the large number of recommendations, especially those in the 
NAS report, seem to be unequivocal. Most appear to be practical and prescriptive 
rather than abstract or aspirational.138 
6. These are scientific reports, written for scientists (i.e. findings and 
recommendations are not legal and not directed to legal practice). Many of the 
reports and reviews were written by scientists (and others) for forensic 
practitioners. They have implications for how forensic practitioners should 
understand their professional responsibilities and obligations and how they conduct 
themselves in relation to legal proceedings. All of the independent reports call for 
further research and changes to current practices. 
7. Relevant research is being undertaken. This is undoubtedly true and highly 
desirable. As research is published the results should, where appropriate, inform                                                         
135 We note that many standards (eg ISO 17025) operate at a very general level. Surprisingly few expert reports are 
compliant with relevant Australian standards. 
136 Significantly, those with formal university training, especially advanced degrees in the sciences, are best placed 
to undertake formal evaluation through validation. 
137 See e.g. David White et al, ‘Passport Officers’ Errors in Face Matching’ (2014) 9 PLOS ONE DOI: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0103510.   
138 Consider the following extract, taken from the NAS report, 184: ‘All results for every forensic science method 
should indicate the uncertainty in the measurements that are made, and studies must be conducted that enable the 
estimation of those values. … the accuracy of forensic methods resulting in classification or individualization 
conclusions needs to be evaluated in well-designed and rigorously conducted studies. The level of accuracy of an 
analysis is likely to be a key determinant of its ultimate probative value.’ 
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practice and reporting—see Section 4.A. The question is what can we say if the 
relevant research has not been undertaken or does support contemporary practices 
and expressions. Practitioners should be transparent and modest. They should 
disclose limitations and frailties and these should inform interpretations and 
conclusions. Once research is published it may be appropriate to modify practices, 
reporting and the kinds of expressions used. 
8. Invoking the report for positive commentary. The reports are sometimes positive in 
their description of current techniques and capabilities, though these favourable 
statements are often quite restricted in scope. If forensic practitioners invoke 
favourable commentary then they should also address criticism, concerns and 
recommendations. 
9. We already have a National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS). The NAS 
recommended that the US government establish a large and independent NIFS to 
oversee the reformation of the forensic sciences. Although the Australian NIFS has 
exerted a generally positive impact on the Australasian forensic landscape, it bears 
little resemblance to the institution recommended by the NAS. Current reforms in 
the United States under the auspices of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST)—a less costly alternative to NIFS—are multidisciplinary and 
vastly better resourced than the abstemiously funded and non-independent 
Australian incarnation of a NIFS.139  
10. The reviewers were not the appropriate ‘community’ to review the forensic 
sciences. It would be misleading to suggest that the committees and individuals 
responsible for the inquiries and reports were misguided or dominated by critics. 
Rather, the various committees and individuals responsible for the reports generally 
took submissions, heard testimony, reviewed literatures (e.g. the NAS report) or 
included forensic practitioners among their number (e.g. the NIST report). Most of 
the members were highly trained and eminent scientists, statisticians, physicians, 
engineers and/or senior jurists (e.g. Edwards, Campbell and Goudge) who came to 
their inquiry with positive expectations regarding the quality of forensic science 
evidence.140 The various review processes, particularly those incorporating 
exogenous multidisciplinary perspectives, would seem to represent a desirable way 
of assessing the forensic sciences.141 Moreover, similarity in the findings and 
recommendations across many different reviews (and jurisdictions) lends 
considerable weight to them.  
11. The authors are not experts in my field. This sort of response is perversely 
parochial. The issue is not whether an author, critic or commentator is a tool mark 
examiner or biologist or document examiner. The issue is whether their concerns 
and criticisms are apposite. Why have critics with technical and scientific 
qualifications from beyond forensic science communities repeatedly expressed 
concerns about the practices in many areas of forensic science and medicine?142                                                         
139 The US government has established an elaborate structure, under the auspices of NIST, to undertake the 
necessary improvements following the NAS report. The Australian NIFS employs just a handful of staff and is 
funded and managed by police. 
140 See e.g. Harry Edwards, ‘Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community’ (2009) 50 
Jurimetrics Journal 5 at 8. 
141 Consider Gary Edmond, ‘Advice for the courts: A multidisciplinary advisory panel?’ (2012) 16 International 
Journal of Evidence & Proof 263-297. Compare the not particularly critical report prepared by the NIJ, just a decade 
before the NAS Report: National Institute of Justice, Forensic Sciences: Review of Status and Needs (Gaithersburg, 
MD, February 1999).  
142 See the informative discussion in Michael Lynch and Simon Cole, ‘Science and Technology Studies on Trial: 
Dilemmas of Expertise’ (2005) 35 Social Studies of Science 269–311; Simon Cole, ‘A Cautionary Tale about 
Cautionary Tales about Intervention’ (2009) 16 Organization 121. We should not forget that fairly weak 
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12. Forensic practitioners are technicians rather than scientists and so the scientific 
commentary is inapplicable. This contention has little to recommend it. 
Practitioners are not insulated from the concerns and criticisns of attentive scientists 
and other commentators on the basis of nomenclature.143 The need for foundational 
research persists however forensic practitioners are characterised. 
13. The Galileo posture – ‘I disagree with the NAS’. Forensic practitioners, particularly 
those without research qualifications, should be cautious—indeed reluctant—to 
unilaterally disagree with the findings and recommendations in the reports. Unless 
backed up by appropriate independent research, such responses do not represent 
good faith or informed engagement with exogenous commentary and criticism. Any 
forensic practitioner offering this kind of response should be closely questioned 
about their familiarity with the report and the process underlying its creation, and 
the basis on which they have formulated their opinion. 
 
This canvassing of potential responses is not intended to stifle debate or even resistance. 
But engagement should be undertaken in good faith and draw upon scientific evidence 
rather than past practices, longstanding assumptions and previous legal accommodation. 
The authors of the various reports were well aware of what was done or allowed 
historically and were critical notwithstanding. Practitioners, and their institutions, 
should consider why mainstream scientists have expressed concerns and recommended 
substantial reform to current practices and reporting, particularly around the positive 
identification of persons and things and even the way apparent similarities are infused 
with significance.144 The reports demand, and provide an opportunity for, re-
consideration of traditional practices and their justifications.  
 Where forensic practitioners are reluctant to adopt the recommendations in the 
reports they are, nevertheless, obliged to engage with them. They should explain why 
the considered assessments of eminent multidisciplinary reviewers are mistaken (or 
inapposite) and make very clear what they have done (i.e. through disclosure and 
transparency) so that others can make their own evaluation. Practitioners should avoid 
trivialising or ignoring scientific criticism and recommendations. We appreciate that 
some of the criticisms undermine the foundations of conventional practices and legally 
recognised techniques.145 Some recommendations may be onerous (occasionally, even 
impractical). Nevertheless, the general thrust of the reports is to call for (more) 
scientific research and to base the practices of forensic practitioners on a firm scientific 
foundation. 
 To ignore or summarily reject substantive criticisms from the NAS and other reports 
is a risky strategy, especially as institutions and disciplines begin to transform their 
practices in accordance with contemporary scientific expectations. Forensic 
practitioners who reject mainstream scientific commitments—around validation and 
reliability, the provision or error rates and indicia of uncertainty, and the threat posed by 
human factors and suggestive procedures—will become increasingly vulnerable when a                                                                                                                                                               
performances around the early processing, analysis and reporting of DNA profiling evidence led to two NRC 
reports. See David Kaye, DNA and the law of evidence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
143 See United States v Haavard 117 F. Supp 2d 848 (S.D. Ind 2000). Contrast Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 
US 137 (1999). 
144 Consider the treatment of the use of similarities in the case of Splatt, substantially criticised in Carl Shannon, 
Royal Commission of Inquiry in Respect to the Case of Edward Charles Splatt (Government Printer, Adelaide, 
1984). 
145 The Canadian Supreme Court recognised that previous admission, and longstanding practices, should not 
insulate techniques from review in R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 290, [31]. See also Leveson, Review of the 
Effectiveness of Criminal Justice. 
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competent cross-examiner seeks to challenge their evidence. Simultaneously, they make 
themselves vulnerable in every subsequent proceeding where their earlier, deficient 
reports and testimony might be raised in cross-examination. Forensic practitioners 
should respond to criticisms with epistemic modesty, taking seriously the advice and 
concerns of mainstream scientists, engineers, statisticians, biomedical researchers and 
cognitive scientists.  
 
5. Pros and cons with transparency, disclosure, epistemic modesty and impartiality 
Relatively few disadvantages flow from following the proposed rubric, complying with 
formal obligations and adopting a more scientific orientation. Most of the risks are on 
the other side, persisting with past practices and traditional commitments that have now 
been subjected to authoritative criticism.   
 Let us begin with benefits. Complying with legal and professional obligations will 
help to facilitate the goal of doing justice in the pursuit of truth.146 It makes it more 
likely that the criminal justice system, particularly prosecutors and the courts, will 
operate according to espoused values and goals. Compliance will help lawyers, judges 
and juries to understand and properly assess forensic science and medicine evidence. 
 Complying with rules and obligations is inherently preferable to non-compliance. It 
reduces the need for secrecy, dissembling and cognitive dissonance. Disclosure, 
transparency, epistemic modesty and impartiality will help to insulate forensic 
practitioners when things unexpectedly take a turn for the worse.147 If the possibility of 
error was proactively conceded in reports and testimony it is more difficult to criticise 
the practitioner if errors are subsequently exposed. Non-compliance, in contrast, will 
make the practitioner vulnerable in potentially hostile legal contexts, such as courts of 
appeal or public inquiries.148  
 Epistemically modest opinions may make the role of a forensic practitioners easier. 
Defence lawyers may be content with appropriate concessions made in reports and 
examination-in-chief regarding the lack of study, uncertainty, the risk of error, and the 
risk of bias from a lack of blinding. The result may be fewer admissibility challenges, 
fewer court appearances, and less expansive cross-examination when forensic 
practitioners are called to testify. In general, compliance will tend to temper the severity 
of challenges from defence lawyers and should also reduce ad hominem attacks to the 
extent that practices and conclusions are evidence-based. 
 It seems unlikely, based on past practice, that greater disclosure and increasingly 
research-based opinions will lead to the exclusion of forensic science evidence. 
Although, legal responses are likely to become increasingly sensitive to the outcome of                                                         
146 H.L. Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
147 Where forensic practitioners become aware of a mistake, or generate a misleading or mistaken impression in 
their report or testimony, even if it was not their fault, they have a responsibility to correct it. They can do the 
following: (a) ask the judge if they might supplement a response, at the time, in order to clarify the answer (or 
avoid giving a partial or misleading impression); (b) indicate to the judge, after testifying (though before standing 
down), that there is an issue that should be raised in the absence of the jury. When the jury has left, the practitioner 
can raise their concern with the judge and lawyers present; and (c) after leaving the witness box, draw the attention 
of the solicitor or prosecutor to the issue. (Forensic practitioners might be advised to generate and retain a 
documentary record of any exchange—e.g. capture the substance of any communication in an email to the solicitor 
and prosecutor). 
148 Consider the treatment of Joy Kuhl in the Royal Commission of inquiry into the Chamberlain Convictions 
(1987), Dr Wallace on gunshot residue in the Eastman Inquiry (2014), Associate Professor Cross in Wood v R 
[2012] NSWCCA 21, Dr Lawrence in Gilham v R [2012] NSWCCA 131, and Dr Manock in Keogh v R (No 2) 
[2014] SASCFC 136. Imagine being summoned by a court of appeal or a royal commission reviewing a (perhaps 
mistaken) conviction to be cross-examined on a report you have just written or wrote a decade ago. The ability to 
point to genuine attempts to properly characterise the evidence and its limitations based on what was known would 
be of tremendous value in such a setting. 
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validation studies.149 Courts may exclude, or impose new qualifications upon, some 
types of forensic science and medicine evidence that were historically admissible (and 
relatively unconstrained), but it is likely that the vast majority of forensic science and 
medicine evidence will continue to be admissible, even if the strength of some of the 
conclusions might be moderated on the basis of experimental research.  
 If admissibility standards are raised or lawyers and judges take more of an interest in 
the (validity and) reliability of forensic science and medicine evidence as part of their 
discretionary practice (e.g. UEL, ss 135, 137 and Tuite), then forensic practitioners 
using validated techniques, and reporting in ways that are consistent with practice 
directions, are least likely to be affected. 
 In one important respect, it is necessary to avoid overstating the benefits of increased 
compliance with scientific and legal norms. While greater disclosure, transparency, 
epistemic modesty and impartiality might signal limitations to the technically literate 
these might not be appreciated by less methodological sophisticated audiences. Mere 
disclosure of oversights and limitations does not necessarily enable the tribunal of fact 
to evaluate the evidence—whether the opinion, the practitioner’s proficiency or even 
credibility.150 Knowing what has not been done is not a substitute for the results of what 
should have been done. Knowing that appropriate testing has not been conducted, 
knowing that error rates should be available but are not, knowing that there was a risk of 
contextual bias that was not addressed, does not enable a decision-maker to somehow 
factor these into their decisions.151 Knowing about unknowns does not necessarily 
facilitate rational decision-making. It may produce too much caution or, more 
problematically given the burden and standard of proof, may be undervalued or 
trivialised. 
 As for the cons associated with compliance, a number might be mooted: loss of 
prestige; diminished scope of legally recognised expertise; having to provide narrower 
or weaker opinions; more limited participation in legal proceedings; loss of 
‘membership’ in the prosecutorial ‘team’; a less direct relationship with the resolution 
of crime (through successful prosecutions); and, the need for more continuing 
education. But it is questionable whether these are real losses. To the extent that they 
were not predicated on scientific research and demonstrated abilities or consistent with 
appropriate role expectations, these traditional practices, relationships and commitments 
were misguided.152 Any perceived loss of prestige is artificial or misplaced, to the extent 
they the former position was grounded on a misunderstanding of expectations and the 
abilities of practitioners. 
 Forensic practitioners might also worry that greater compliance with legal rules and 
professional obligations might lead to the exclusion or tempering of evidence and so 
perhaps result in fewer convictions. Such concerns reflect a misunderstanding of their 
role, and of the operation of the presumption of innocence. As impartial servants of the 
courts, disinterested in the outcome of proceedings, forensic practitioners should not be 
especially concerned if a particular individual is not prosecuted or convicted. However, 
it is useful to note that greater disclosure and transparency, and even acknowledging the 
real possibility of human error, is only likely to have a marginal impact. In most cases                                                         
149 See e.g. Tuite v The Queen [2015] VSCA 148. 
150 Contrast the English approach in R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876, discussed in Note, ‘Atkins v The 
Emperor: the “cautious” use of unreliable “expert” opinion’ (2010) 14 The International Journal of Evidence & 
Proof 146. 
151 Edmond, Forensic science evidence and the conditions for rational (jury) evaluation’. 
152 It is likely that losses will primarily manifest in what can be said, and a clearer appreciation of the need for 
more research in many areas of forensic science and medicine routinely admitted and relied upon in criminal 
proceedings. 
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the probative value of forensic science evidence will not be dramatically reduced. 
Further, most pleas and prosecutions rely on a range of different types of direct and/or 
circumstantial evidence, and moderating the strength of one piece of the evidence will 
not necessarily introduce reasonable doubt overall. Greater compliance will, however, 
decrease the gap between current practice and legal principles and aspirations; making 
criminal proceedings fairer because outcomes are based on evidence that is consistent 
with what is known and rendered susceptible to evaluation.  
 We can envisage state-employed forensic practitioners expressing concerns about the 
behavior of defence lawyers and expert witnesses called by the defence. While expert 
witnesses called by the defence have the same basic legal obligations (drawn from 
relevant practice directions), there may be slightly fewer expectations in relation to 
disclosure and they might not be bound as tightly by the high standards applicable to the 
state’s model forensic scientists. Misconduct or highly strategic actions by the defence 
do not provide a warrant for the prosecution to circumvent legal and professional 
obligations. Under no circumstances should forensic practitioners take it upon 
themselves to somehow compensate for defence behaviour or problems with the case. It 
makes no difference what defence lawyers might say or do, improved disclosure, more 
transparency and a modest epistemology, remain the guiding principles for the forensic 
practitioner. Obligations to speak truthfully and to impartially serve the court override 
any obligation to a party or camp—whether the police or prosecution, 
victim/complainant or even personal beliefs about the guilt of the accused.  
 Obviously, where a defence witness has made false, misleading or controvertible 
claims, forensic practitioners should, indeed have an obligation to, point them out to the 
prosecutor and respond during their testimony (or in any subsequent report). Forensic 
practitioners do not need to stand idly if defence experts are mistaken, misguided or 
duplicitous.  
  
 
6. Discussion 
This essay, along with HTCE, was written because forensic practitioners have not 
always understood or fulfilled their obligations. Cultures of secrecy (and distrust of 
outsiders), non-disclosure, conviction-oriented investigation and reporting, and 
inattention to mainstream scientific research and recommendations remain entrenched 
in some areas of forensic science and some public institutions. In this essay we have 
endeavoured to explain what forensic practitioners should be doing to fulfill their 
professional and legal obligations along with some of the reasons for our 
recommendations. We accept that other participants in the criminal justice system, 
conspicuously prosecutors and defence lawyers, have not always performed well, and 
that some of their derogations and advice may have contributed to misunderstandings as 
to the role identity and expectations on forensic practitioners. We also accept that some 
of the expectations and their modern expressions are relatively new; often developed in 
response to new legal rules (e.g. UEL) and practice directions emerging out of 
experience with wrongful convictions, public inquiries and their recommendations.153 
History and misunderstandings may help us to understand how we got to where we are, 
but they do not excuse the failure to comply with the range of formal expectations 
imposed on forensic practitioners. Regardless of how other professional groups might                                                         
153 Concerns and recommendations from public inquiries are not necessarily incorporated into contemporary legal 
practice and consciousness. Consider Trevor Morling, Report of the Commissioner: Royal Commission of inquiry 
into the Chamberlain Convictions (1987); Carl Shannon, Royal Commission of Inquiry in Respect to the Case of 
Edward Charles Splatt (Government Printer, Adelaide, 1984). 
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respond to the changing socio-legal environment, forensic practitioners are obliged to 
reform their practices in line with legal rules, professional codes and the best scientific 
research and advice available. In order to assist this end, we have provided an indication 
of the kinds of issues and subjects they should be endeavouring to address through the 
provision of overarching principles—namely, disclosure, transparency, epistemic 
modesty and impartiality—intended to capture and clarify the expectations on modern 
forensic practitioners. 
 In concluding, it is important to address a few misapprehensions and attitudes that 
are inconsistent with the expectations on modern forensic scientists. Forensic 
practitioners are not asked or expected to prove guilt. Rather, in the vast majority of 
cases they can only provide more modest insights—such as whether two things (e.g. 
latent prints, fibres or handwriting samples) appear similar and whether the observed 
similarities support one or more propositions pertaining to the source.154 Questions of 
what such assessments (usually opinions) mean to the case as a whole are generally not 
for forensic practitioners. To the extent that forensic practitioners endeavour to address 
or resolve the question of guilt, in most cases they will have trespassed from the limited 
role assigned to the expert witness onto the role of the fact-finder. Under our 
constitutions (both state and federal), it is for the tribunal of fact (whether jury or judge 
sitting in summary judgment) to evaluate the evidence in relation to the burden and 
standard of proof.  
 The impartial forensic practitioner does not omit relevant information, does not omit 
controversy and criticism, does not solicit ‘review’ from those most favourably disposed 
to a position, and does not omit differences of opinion amongst colleagues. Impartial 
forensic practitioners do not express opinions that extend further than underlying 
research (i.e. knowledge) can support. Impartiality requires the disclosure of 
information that is relevant to understanding and evaluating the practitioner’s opinion. 
By definition, impartiality requires being indifferent as to the parties or outcomes in the 
provision of opinion evidence and the information required to make sense of it. It also 
means fully qualifying the opinion and even conveying qualifications that the forensic 
practitioner might personally disagree with. 
 Forensic practitioners are obliged to present their evidence in the most accurate and 
comprehensible ways available.155 Their primary obligation is to the court—to tell the 
truth and to act impartially. This obligation trumps and traduces any perceived 
obligation to the prosecution, the police, their employer, the victim or complainant, and 
even to protect the community. Forensic practitioners are not, and should not consider 
themselves, part of the prosecution ‘team’. Where possible, they should avoid too much 
(or unnecessary) contact with prosecutors, victims, complainants and their families, 
because it may compromise their actual or apparent impartiality. Forensic practitioners 
should make themselves available to the defence and should speak frankly and assist 
defence lawyers if asked questions in a pre-trial conference. 
 In order to assist forensic practitioners to orient themselves, it is useful to pose a few 
questions. These questions are intended to encourage forensic practitioners (and others) 
to think about their practices and attitudes. Do you comply in good faith with legal 
practice directions and your professional responsibilities? Are you disclosing 
assumptions, limitations, problems, difficulties, uncertainties, the lack of validation, 
criticisms and recommendations, in a genuine or constructive manner, that explains or 
engages with their significance and implications? If not, why not? What do you think                                                         
154 Other examples might relate to the cause of an injury or death. 
155 Gary Edmond and Andrew Roberts, ‘Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic Science and 
Medicine’ (2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 359. 
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your role is? What is your model of impartiality? Are you intentionally or unwittingly 
suppressing information that is relevant to understanding your expertise and 
performance (or defence decisions about what to do in relation to your evidence)? Are 
you, perhaps unintentionally, usurping the role of the tribunal of fact by withholding 
information that would enable it to make more informed decisions? How do impartiality 
and your overriding duty to the court (rather than your employer, the prosecutor and 
conviction) manifest in your report and testimony? Would your practices and opinions 
satisfy an independent panel of scientists? If not, why not? One useful, if slightly 
confronting, way to think about this is to ask: Would I have written the same (or a 
substantially similar) report if I was engaged by the defence? 
 Ours is an accusatorial system. It is the responsibility of the state to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused has few evidentiary obligations (beyond some 
defences and giving notices). The emphasis on prosecutorial disclosure and 
transparency sits comfortably within this framework. Notwithstanding our adversarial 
procedure, responsibility for identifying and conveying known limitations with the 
state’s forensic science and medicine evidence should not fall exclusively upon the 
accused. Prosecutors and experts have formidable obligations that require them to 
disclose problems and to actually present them to the tribunal of fact. The accused 
should not bear the risk that evidence is error free or that trial ‘safeguards’ work. The 
state has the burden and an obligation to evaluate techniques, attend to notorious risks 
(e.g. contextual bias) and qualify evidence appropriately; based on what is known. The 
state and its employees are obliged to make trials (and appeals) substantially fair. 
 The decreasing resourcing of trials in conjunction with the increased use of scientific 
and technical evidence puts an additional burden on prosecutors and forensic scientists. 
In most contested cases it is unlikely that the defence will have access to an expert to 
advise the lawyers preparing the case or to provide rebuttal evidence.156 The majority of 
reports used in charge and plea negotiations or contested proceedings will not be 
reviewed by an independent scientist. A prosecution expert’s failure to comply with 
formal obligations, particularly the failure to disclose limitations and make what was 
done transparent, will likely mean that others in the legal system will be oblivious to 
limitations with the evidence, at least in the short term. Our system works poorly when 
the defence is deprived of information that might help it to ascertain the value of 
incriminating opinions. 
 Given the obligations on forensic practitioners to assist the court through the 
impartial provision of evidence, we have to wonder about cultures that have produced 
secrecy, a lack of transparency and an apparent alignment with investigators and 
prosecutors where these are not required and are undesirable. We must also wonder 
about the structural and institutional biases embedded in not only the systematic 
omission of information but also endemic over-claiming (where we do not know what 
claims can be substantiated). It is time for forensic practitioners to comply with formal 
rules and the expectations of a modern system of criminal justice. Compliance with 
explicit role expectations will improve the professionalization of forensic practitioners 
and provide the best possible insulation from cross-examination and potentially hostile 
legal environments. Simultaneously, and more importantly, it will advance the 
overarching goal of helping to dispense justice.  
 
                                                         
156 The defence does not usually have access to expert advice. And, preliminary analyses suggest that calling a 
rebuttal expert is not a particularly effective means of countering misrepresented and exaggerated forensic science 
evidence at trial. 
